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I. Introduction
The government owes us nothing. That is, the Constitution
does not require the government to protect us or to provide
services.1 Instead, the Constitution restricts the government from
1.

See SOTIRIOS BARBER, WELFARE

AND THE

CONSTITUTION 23 (2003)
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acting.2 For example, citizens enjoy the sense of security provided
by their local police force, but the police are not constitutionally
obligated to respond to every emergency call.3 As a corollary to
this “no-duty” rule, state actors generally cannot be liable for
inaction.4 Plaintiffs who sue the state on an affirmative-duty
based claim face a formidable challenge, and yet plaintiffs
frequently assert the claims.5
The no-duty rule is not without exception. In Youngberg v.
Romeo,6 the Supreme Court ruled that states7 owe involuntarily
committed state-hospital patients affirmative duties of care,
protection, and rehabilitation.8 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Court
also recognized affirmative duties for prisoners,9 for pre-trial
detainees,10 and for arrestees.11 But in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services,12 the Supreme Court
(explaining that the negative-liberties model of the Constitution provides no
basis for substantive benefits).
2. Id.
3. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760–61 (2005)
(stating that states have discretion in exercising their police functions).
4. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
196–97 (1989) (“[T]he State cannot be held liable under the [Due Process]
Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide
them.”).
5. See 1 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES § 3.09[D] (4th ed. 2012) (“[Section] 1983 claimants continue to file
large numbers of due process duty to protect claims.”).
6. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316–17 (1982) (ruling that
states owe affirmative duties under substantive due process to involuntarily
committed individuals).
7. This Note uses the term “state” to include state and local entities and
their agents.
8. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316–17.
9. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (establishing that, under
the Eighth Amendment, states owe affirmative duties to provide medical care to
prisoners).
10. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (establishing states’
affirmative duty to provide safe conditions to pretrial detainees).
11. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)
(establishing states’ affirmative duty to provide emergency medical care to
persons under arrest).
12. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
191 (1989) (holding that the state’s failure to protect an individual from private
harm did not violate the Due Process Clause).
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sharply cabined liability premised on affirmative-duty theories
and fortified the general no-duty rule.13 Nonetheless, DeShaney
reiterated Youngberg’s rule that involuntary patients enjoy
affirmative rights.14 And circuit courts generally interpret
DeShaney as creating a rule that affirmative duties arise in three
discrete scenarios: (1) formal custody; (2) functional custody; and
(3) state-created danger.15
State hospitals present a unique context for analyzing
affirmative duties. Unlike criminal custodial settings, state laws
set forth procedures for people to either voluntarily enter state
hospitals or to be involuntarily committed.16 The “voluntary” and
“involuntary” labels seem, at first blush, to describe a particular
patient’s relationship to the state: Involuntary patients are held
against their will, and voluntary patients fully consent to
hospitalization. The “voluntary” label often provides a faulty
description, however, because state-hospital patients may lack
competency to give informed consent, and coercive forces may
taint their consent.17
This Note focuses on affirmative duties to voluntary statehospital patients.18 If the state involuntarily commits a patient,
formally taking custody, then the state has an affirmative duty to
13. See PETER IRONS, BRENNAN VS. REHNQUIST 107 (1994) (“The Court went
out of its way to decide the DeShaney case. . . . Rehnquist’s majority opinion in
the case suggests that he wanted to send a message to federal judges.”).
14. See id. at 199 (discussing established affirmative-duty contexts).
15. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the functional custody exception); infra
Part II.C.2 (discussing the state-created danger exception). For clarity, in this
Note, “formal custody” refers to incarceration, involuntary commitment, pretrial detention, and arrest. “Functional custody” refers to analogous situations
in which the state, through affirmative acts, creates a custodial relationship.
“State-created danger” refers to situations in which the state acts either to
create a danger or to render an individual more vulnerable to a danger.
16. See infra Part III.A (reviewing commitment laws).
17. See infra Part V (raising concerns with the voluntary distinction).
18. This Note uses the terms “mental health patient” and “state-hospital
patient” to refer to individuals receiving inpatient treatment in state-operated
psychiatric facilities, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Patients in private
facilities are outside this Note’s scope. Private facilities and employees generally
are not state actors, and therefore are not subject to § 1983. See Civil Action for
Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (imposing liability against state
actors).
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protect and care for that person.19 But what about voluntary
patients? Circuits are split on this question.20 Does the state owe
different obligations to patients based simply on a formal
status—voluntary or involuntary?21 What if state law allows a
facility to hold a voluntary patient for seventy-two hours after the
patient decides he wants to leave?22 What if a voluntary patient is
so psychiatrically ill that state law forbids discharge?23 What if
the hospital knows that a patient is likely to harm another
patient?24
Courts disagree on how to answer these questions.25 Circuits
generally take one of two approaches: (1) a strict status-based
test, using an individual’s formal “voluntary” or “involuntary”
status to determine if the state owes affirmative duties,26 or (2) a
fact-intensive inquiry of whether the individual was truly a
voluntary patient when the harm occurred.27 Both analyses,
however, emphasize the individual’s commitment status—
voluntary or involuntary—as the chief element.28
Should courts employ the voluntary/involuntary distinction
as the engine driving the analytic train? This Note argues: No.
First, the distinction may amount to an artificial signifier.
Affirmative duty analysis seeks to understand the relationship
19. See infra notes 67–71 and accompanying text (discussing Youngberg).
20. See infra Part IV (reviewing the circuit split).
21. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the First Circuit’s decision in
Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1992)).
22. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the Third Circuit’s decision in Torisky
v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2006)).
23. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s decisions in
Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292 (8th Cir. 1996), and Shelton v. Ark. Dep’t
Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2012)).
24. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Walton
v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
25. See infra Part IV (analyzing the different approaches circuit courts take
in analyzing affirmative duties to state-hospital patients).
26. See infra Part IV.A (reviewing cases that adopt a status-based
analysis).
27. See infra Part IV.B (discussing cases that adopt a fact-based analysis).
28. See infra notes 234–41, 210–11, 257–58, 280, 303–06, 340–41 and
accompanying text (discussing the circuit courts’ focus on the voluntary
distinction).
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and course of dealings between the petitioner and the state.29
While the labels “voluntary” and “involuntary” superficially
signal whether a patient’s admission is a product of consent or of
confinement, these labels can be misleading.30 Second, the
voluntary distinction loses sight of alternative bases for
affirmative rights. When courts focus on whether a state-hospital
patient is voluntary, either by status or de facto, the court may
overlook or neglect to explore fully the functional custody and
state-created danger exceptions.31
This Note puts forth an alternative analytic structure for
deciding whether state-hospital patients can establish that the
state owed affirmative Youngberg duties.32 Beginning with the
presumption that the state owes no affirmative duty,33 the court
next considers each DeShaney exception in turn. First, if an
individual is committed involuntarily, then Youngberg duties
exist based on formal custody. Second, if an individual is a
voluntary patient, then Youngberg duties exist if the state
exercises functional custody by restricting the person’s liberty.
Third, if an individual is a voluntary patient, then Youngberg
duties exist if the state creates or increases a danger threatening
the individual.
Part I of this Note introduces the issues to be addressed. Part
II reviews substantive due process and its general role in
restricting government action. Part II then analyzes Youngberg
and DeShaney before briefly reviewing the current state of
affirmative duty law, including both the functional custody and
the state-created danger doctrines. Part III focuses on mental
health law, providing a background on the laws governing
29. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (explaining that the
Fourteenth Amendment governs the relationship between individuals and state
governments).
30. See infra Part V.A (examining competency and coercion in voluntary
admissions).
31. See infra notes 266, 339–42 and accompanying text (discussing the
circuits’ focus on voluntariness, rather than on functional custody or statecreated danger); infra notes 214–20 and accompanying text (discussing Judge
Suhreinrich’s concurrence in Higgs, which argued that the majority should have
considered functional custody and state-created danger).
32. Infra Part VI.
33. See infra Part VI.A (containing this Note’s recommended analysis).
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voluntary and involuntary admission and on the state hospital
context in light of recent historical trends. Part IV reviews the
circuit split over whether voluntary state-hospital patients are
owed affirmative duties. Part V raises concerns about circuits’
focus on the voluntary/involuntary distinction. This Note
concludes in Part VI by proposing an analysis for approaching
affirmative duties in the state hospital context, arguing that this
approach gives appropriate weight to voluntary/involuntary
issues, retains doctrinal integrity, and will not overburden
states.
II. Substantive Due Process and Affirmative Duties
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects
individuals from unreasonable or oppressive government
action.34 State actors violate an individual’s substantive due
process rights if they act so unreasonably or so oppressively that
no amount of procedural protections could justify their action.35
The scope of these substantive rights, however, is quite limited.36
Constitutional law does not remedy every state actor’s wrong.37
Due process of law originated in English law as a legal
maxim meant to restrain the sovereign.38 At common law, the
substantive prong protected property and contract rights.39
American jurisprudence continued recognizing due process as a
“significant constitutional limitation[]” on executive and
34. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (explaining that the Due Process Clause
provides procedural and substantive protections against government action
depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property in an arbitrary or oppressive
manner). This Note focuses only on the substantive prong of due process.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 332 (“[The Constitution] does not purport to supplant
traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for
injuries that attend living together in society.”).
38. See JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 7, 9 (2003)
(discussing the Magna Carta’s guarantee that “the law of the land” safeguards
individual rights).
39. See id. at 98–102 (summarizing the common law roots of due process
and the doctrine’s evolution in American jurisprudence).
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legislative power.40 Over time, the doctrine evolved, with
substantive due process now protecting individual interests
“relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily
integrity.”41 The Court has long held that individuals possess a
fundamental right to personal autonomy,42 including in a medical
setting.43
Patients who suffer some injury while in a state hospital may
claim that the state violated their substantive due process
rights.44 Due process rights may be vindicated via claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.45 And in the last few decades, § 1983 has
“emerged as a potent weapon for state hospital patients.”46 These
constitutional claims are popular for mental health advocates
seeking “system-wide changes,” because § 1983 actions offer
injunctive relief and legal fees in addition to compensatory
damages.47

40. Id. at 9.
41. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (plurality opinion).
42. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others.”).
43. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
(“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body.”). The Supreme Court has adopted Judge
Cardozo’s articulation in Schloendorff of the individual’s right to control his
body from unwanted medical intervention. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
45. See Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
46. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 137 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing how mental health
advocates began using civil rights actions under § 1983 in the late twentieth
century to achieve social reform).
47. See id. at 138 (explaining why the remedies available pursuant to a
§ 1983 claim may be more attractive than state law tort remedies when legal
advocates hope to effect broad change in state hospitals).
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This Part first reviews the doctrine of substantive due
process. Generally, this doctrine restricts, rather than mandates,
government action.48 Then, this Part reviews the two Supreme
Court cases governing when a state owes affirmative duties to
state-hospital patients: Youngberg and DeShaney.49 Finally, this
Part summarizes the affirmative-duty rules that circuit courts
have developed after DeShaney.50
A. Substantive Due Process: A Charter of Negative Duties
Substantive due process foists negative duties on the
government, curtailing its power.51 Judge Posner, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, articulated the Fourteenth Amendment’s scope
in a case involving a dangerous, mentally ill person who—
subsequent to being released by the state—murdered the
plaintiff’s decedent:
There is a constitutional right not to be murdered by a state
officer, for the state violates the Fourteenth Amendment when
its officer, acting under color of state law, deprives a person of
life without due process of law. But there is no constitutional
right to be protected by the state against being murdered by
criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to
protect its residents against such predators but it does not
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution. The
Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state
to let people alone; it does not require the federal government
or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service
as maintaining law and order.52

The Supreme Court consistently affirms this characterization of
the Fourteenth Amendment as “a charter of negative liberties.”53
48. See infra Part II.A (explaining the general no-duty rule).
49. See infra Part II.B (examining Youngberg and DeShaney).
50. See infra Part II.C (discussing post-DeShaney developments).
51. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195 (1989) (“The [Substantive Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on
the State’s power to act . . . .”).
52. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
53. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992)
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B. Affirmative Duty Exceptions: Youngberg and DeShaney

The general rule that the Due Process Clause imposes
negative duties is not absolute. In discrete contexts, the Clause
imposes affirmative duties, calling on the state to proactively
serve or protect.54
Circuit courts have labored to define the scope of affirmative
duties for several decades. In Martinez v. California,55 Justice
Stevens suggested in dicta that a state might owe an affirmative
duty of protection if the state (1) becomes aware of a special
danger threatening a specific individual and (2) indicates a
willingness to protect that person.56 Many circuits interpreted
this language to create a “special-relationship” doctrine, whereby
the government undertakes an obligation to protect persons with
whom it shares a special relationship.57 These circuits began
(“Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause supports
petitioner’s claim that the governmental employer’s duty to provide its
employees with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the
Due Process Clause.”); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“The
guarantee of due process has never been understood to mean that the State
must guarantee due care on the part of its officials.”).
54. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198 (“It is true that in certain limited
circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of
care and protection with respect to particular individuals.”).
55. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980) (holding that the
state was not liable for a murder committed by a parolee five months after the
state released him).
56. See id. at 285
[T]he parole board was not aware that appellants’ decedent, as
distinguished from the public at large, faced any special danger. We
need not and do not decide that a parole officer could never be
deemed to “deprive” someone of life by action taken in connection
with the release of a prisoner on parole.
57. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 855 F.2d 1421, 1425–26 (9th
Cir. 1988) (ruling that the plaintiff’s allegations that the state owed an
affirmative duty of police protection after the state issued a restraining order
and received notice of plaintiff’s danger was sufficient to state a claim under the
special-relationship doctrine); Estate of Bailey v. Cnty. of York, 768 F.2d 503,
510–11 (3d Cir. 1985) (vacating and remanding the district court’s dismissal of a
§ 1983 claim and ruling that plaintiff might be able to prove the state violated
an affirmative duty arising under the special-relationship doctrine); Jones v.
Phyfer, 761 F.2d 642, 644–45 (11th Cir. 1985) (“What is required in a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action is the establishment of a special relationship between the victim
and the criminal or between the victim and the state, or some showing that the
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finding affirmative duties grounded in substantive due process
following Martinez.
In the context of mental health patients, two Supreme Court
cases shape the legal doctrine. First, in Youngberg,58 the Court
held that the government takes on affirmative duties when it
involuntarily confines a person to a mental health facility.59
Second, in DeShaney,60 the Court hemmed in the scope of
affirmative duties.61

victim, as distinguished from the public at large, faced a special danger.”);
Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190–94 & n.11 (4th Cir. 1984) (dictum)
(examining circuit precedent and concluding that affirmative duties may arise
out of special relationships, particularly if factors such as legal custody,
expressed desire by state to help, and state’s knowledge of claimant’s danger are
present), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Fox v. Curtis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th
Cir. 1983) (stating that “a right and corollary duty may arise out of special
custodial or other relationships created or assumed by the state in respect of
particular persons”). But see, e.g., Harpoole v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 820
F.2d 923, 926–27 (8th Cir. 1987) (analyzing and rejecting the specialrelationship doctrine, and criticizing its reliance on Supreme Court dicta rather
than statutory text or constitutional principles); Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty.
Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1035–36 (11th Cir. 1987) (ruling that constitutional
affirmative duties arise only when the state creates or increases a danger
through its “exercise of coercion, dominion, or restraint”); Estate of Gilmore v.
Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720–22 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that the Supreme Court’s
“vague hints” left “the door slightly ajar” for special-relationship claims, but
ruling that “the state must be more directly implicated” in causing the harm
than merely knowing of a special danger), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
58. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (ruling that an
individual who has been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital
“enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and
safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests”).
59. Id.
60. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
191 (1989) (holding that the state’s failure to protect an individual from private
harm did not violate the Due Process Clause).
61. See id. at 196 (“[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process
Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where
such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which
the government itself may not deprive the individual.”).
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1. Youngberg v. Romeo

In 1982, the Supreme Court first considered whether an
involuntarily confined mental health patient possesses liberty
interests under substantive due process in Youngberg v. Romeo.62
Youngberg involved a “profoundly retarded” thirty-three-year-old
man who was civilly committed to Pennhurst, a state psychiatric
facility, because he posed an imminent danger to himself and
others.63 At Pennhurst, hospital staff proposed a treatment plan
designed to reduce Mr. Romeo’s aggressive and violent behaviors,
but never implemented it.64 Mr. Romeo repeatedly suffered
injuries, some of which were self-inflicted, during the
hospitalization.65 Mr. Romeo’s mother filed suit against the
hospital’s directors and supervisors, alleging in part that the
defendants violated Mr. Romeo’s Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process rights.66
The Supreme Court ruled that the State had violated Mr.
Romeo’s substantive due process rights by not fulfilling its
affirmative obligation to protect and care for him.67 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, analogized involuntary state
hospitalization to incarceration.68 Just as the state owes
affirmative duties to prisoners in public prisons, it also owes
duties to involuntary patients in public hospitals.69 The hospital
must provide food, shelter, clothing, and medical care to all

62. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314.
63. Id. at 309–10.
64. Id. at 310–11.
65. See id. at 310 (stating that petitioner’s complaint alleged that Mr.
Romeo was injured “on at least sixty-three occasions”).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 324 (“Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected
interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive
confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these
interests.”).
68. Id. at 315.
69. See id. at 315–16 (“If it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold
convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine
the involuntarily committed—who may not be punished at all—in unsafe
conditions.”).
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patients.70 But Mr. Romeo’s rights included more than these basic
services. The Court ruled that states owe involuntarily committed
individuals certain rights (Youngberg rights): (1) the right to
reasonable care and safety; (2) the right to reasonably
nonrestrictive conditions; and (3) the right to any training or
rehabilitation associated with these interests.71
The decision does not address whether Youngberg rights
extend to voluntary patients. Some lower courts interpreted
Justice Powell’s opinion as applying to all mental health patients,
irrespective of the method of admission—voluntary or
involuntary.72 Additionally, some circuit courts continued finding
affirmative duties based on Martinez and the special-relationship
doctrine.73
In 1989, the Supreme Court revisited its affirmative duty
rulings in DeShaney, a case set outside of a psychiatric
institution, but nonetheless broadly addressing the scope and
nature of substantive due process protections.74
2. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court considered whether the
Substantive Due Process Clause requires states to protect
70. See id. at 315, 324 (noting in dicta that the State conceded that it owes
these duties to all state-hospital patients).
71. See id. at 314–25 (finding each of these liberty interests). The Court
further determined that a “professional judgment” standard should apply to
determine whether the state violated its duties to protect or care for a patient.
See id. at 321–22 (reasoning that deferring to the hospital clinicians’ judgment
is appropriate because it allows hospitals to concentrate on treating patients
according to their individual needs without imposing an onerous blanket rule).
72. See Savidge v. Fincannon, 836 F.2d 898, 907 n.44 (5th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting the argument that Youngberg applies only when an individual has
been confined through formal proceedings); Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of N.D.
v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 485 (D.N.D. 1982) (“[I]f the plaintiffs had voluntarily
consented to their admission to the Grafton state school, it would not follow that
all their rights to liberty under the due process clause were waived.”), aff’d and
remanded, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
73. See supra note 57 (listing pre-DeShaney circuit cases on special
relationships).
74. See infra Part II.B.2 (examining the DeShaney ruling).
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individuals from private—rather than state-inflicted—harm.75
DeShaney is not about mental health patients. Joshua DeShaney
was a four-year-old boy who became involved with Wisconsin’s
Department of Social Services (DSS) in January 1983 because of
his father’s abuse.76 During 1983, Joshua was hospitalized three
times for injuries; hospital staff suspected child abuse each time
and contacted DSS.77 DSS placed Joshua under the hospital’s
temporary custody for three days after the first report, but
returned Joshua to his father’s home three days later, and began
sending a social worker out to visit the home monthly.78 Over a
period of a little more than a year, Joshua kept showing up the
emergency room, injured; the hospital kept reporting the injuries
to DSS; and DSS kept sending the social worker—and nothing
more.79 The social worker documented “suspicious injuries on
Joshua’s head” and “continuing suspicions” that Joshua was
being physically abused.80 Despite these reports, DSS took no
further action.81 In March 1984, Joshua went into a lifethreatening coma.82 Emergency surgery revealed brain damage
resulting from repeated head injuries over a long period.83 Now
“profoundly retarded,” he would likely spend the rest of his life in
an institution.84 Joshua’s mother sued DSS on his behalf, alleging
that DSS knew of or should have reasonably known about the
abuse, and so the State violated Joshua’s due process rights by
failing to protect him.85
75. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
194 (1989) (characterizing the issue presented as “when, if ever, the failure of a
state or local governmental entity or its agents to provide an individual with
adequate protective services constitutes a violation of the individual’s due
process rights”).
76. Id. at 192–93.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 193.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 193–94.
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The Supreme Court disagreed. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, analyzed the scope of substantive due
process and the nature of its protections. The majority began its
analysis with the principle that the Due Process Clause functions
as a limitation on the government.86 The Clause restricts the
government—it does not empower the government by requiring
states to protect society or provide services.87 From this premise,
the majority reasoned that a state cannot be liable for private
violence because states have no duty to protect against this
violence.88 Youngberg, according to the majority, “stand[s] for the
proposition that when [a] State takes a person into its custody
and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes
upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for
his safety and general well-being.”89
The Court also expressly rejected the argument that
affirmative duties might derive from a special relationship.90 The
special-relationship doctrine implied that affirmative duties arise
from the state’s knowledge of danger and its indicated willingness
to help.91 Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the doctrine’s
analysis misconstrues the nature and purpose of affirmative
duties, which are meant to protect individuals from harms caused
86. See id. at 194–96 (reviewing the Clause’s text, history, and supporting
doctrine).
87. See id. at 196 (“The Due Process Clauses generally confer no
affirmative right to governmental aid.”). Some scholars criticize Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause, arguing that it
“fundamentally distorts the meaning . . . by abstracting the language from its
historical context.” Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection,
Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 561 (2001). In his
Article, Professor Heyman analyzes the Fourteenth Amendment’s origins from
English law, as well as the congressional debates and framers’ intentions in
adopting the Amendment. Id. He concludes that the view that the Due Process
Clause provides only negative duties is “indefensible, and that the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment in no way forecloses recognition of a constitutional
right to protection.” Id. at 512.
88. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196–97.
89. Id. at 199–200. Justice Brennan criticized this characterization of
Youngberg in his dissent. Infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
90. See id. at 197–98 (discussing the special-relationship argument
advanced here by petitioners and accepted in several circuit courts after
Martinez, but ultimately rejecting the argument).
91. Id. at 197 n.4.
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by affirmative state acts that render people unable to act on their
own behalf.92 Without affirmative state action, duties will not
arise.93
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
dissented and criticized the majority’s analytic posture.94 Justice
Brennan did not disagree that, as a general principle, the Due
Process Clause imposes no obligation on the government to
provide services.95 But the majority’s “initial fixation” with this
principle led it astray.96 Approaching affirmative-duty claims
with “suspicion,” the majority framed the case as one about
inaction: the state’s failure to protect Joshua.97 Any actions that
the state did take became tangentially important.98 To the
majority, the question was whether a state should be liable for
inaction. The majority viewed the facts through a skewed lens.99
Focusing in on what did not happen—the ways the state did not
exercise
custody
or
increase
Joshua’s
vulnerability,
“foreshadow[ed]—perhaps even preordain[ed]” the conclusion.100
Justice Brennan argued that a proper analysis should begin
differently and ask what actions the state did take.101
Justice Brennan also took issue with the majority’s
characterization of Youngberg—that the state owed affirmative
duties because it confined Mr. Romeo’s liberty through civil
commitment.102 Justice Brennan asserted that Mr. Romeo’s
constitutional right did not spring from the government’s prior
92. Id. at 200.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 203–12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 203 (stating that the Court’s precedent supports this
principle).
96. See id. at 205 (stating that the majority’s preoccupation with the
negative rights principle leaves the majority “unable to appreciate” Court
precedent related to when affirmative rights arise).
97. Id. at 204.
98. Id.
99. See id. (arguing that the majority’s baseline perspective of no positive
rights brings about “a concomitant suspicion of any claim that seems to depend
on such rights”).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 205.
102. Id. at 206.
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act of committing him.103 The affirmative duty arose because the
state “separated him from other sources of aid,” obliging the state
to provide substitute aid.104 Mr. Romeo was unable to care for
himself because he was mentally retarded, not because he was
confined.105
In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun highlighted the
case’s tragic facts, “displaying emotion rarely seen in Supreme
Court opinions.”106 He argued that the majority’s “sterile
formalism” in distinguishing between action and inaction was
inappropriate and marked “a sad commentary on American life,
and constitutional principles.”107 DSS knew that Joshua was in
danger, and DSS chose “inaction.”108 The majority, he asserted,
misread “the broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment,” which were designed to prevent such a rigidly
formalistic interpretation of the law.109 By adopting this
formalistic distinction between action and inaction, Justice
Blackmun alleged, the majority opinion recalled “the antebellum
judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves.”110
Despite passionate criticisms in the dissents and from legal
scholars,111 DeShaney remains good law.112 The Substantive Due
103. See id. (“This restatement of Youngberg’s holding should come as a
surprise.”).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE
CONSTITUTION 184 (2010) (summarizing Justice Blackmun’s dissent).
107. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212–
13 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 212.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 182 (arguing that DeShaney
represents a “particularly troubling” example of how a “conservative attack” on
the Constitution in recent decades has caused the Supreme Court to limit
constitutional liberties and protections); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of
Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 10 (1989) (criticizing the majority’s analysis because its “stilted, premodern paradigm” fails to understand how Wisconsin “may itself have played a
major role in shaping the world it observes”).
112. See infra notes 118–19 (stating that DeShaney remains the Supreme
Court’s preeminent ruling on affirmative duties under substantive due process).
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Process Clause does not generally require states to affirmatively
protect individuals, and so a state is not liable if an individual
becomes injured after the state fails to protect him.113 DeShaney’s
tone strongly suggests that it hoped to firmly limit the scope of
affirmative duties.114 The Chief Justice, however, identified
several contexts that give rise to affirmative duties on the state:
(1) in previously enumerated contexts involving formal custody—
incarceration, civil commitment, pre-trial detention, and police
custody;115 (2) when a state takes an individual into functional
custody through an affirmative action, restricting that person’s
ability to protect himself;116 and (3) when a state creates a danger
or causes an individual to be more vulnerable to a danger.117
C. Affirmative Duties After DeShaney
DeShaney remains the Supreme Court’s authoritative ruling
on affirmative duties under the Substantive Due Process
Clause.118 The Court has subsequently affirmed DeShaney’s
113. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196–
97 (1989).
114. See id. at 202–03 (remarking that “natural sympathy” pushes judges
and lawyers to seek compensation for Joshua, but cautioning that the state
actors “should not have [liability] thrust upon them by this Court’s expansion of
the Due Process Clause”).
115. Id. at 198–99. DeShaney noted that some circuit court precedent also
includes foster children in this list, but the Court declined to rule on this issue.
Id. at 201 n.9. Most circuits addressing this issue since DeShaney have ruled
that states owe affirmative duties to children placed in foster homes. See
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 40–41 &
n.213 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 2d ed. 2008) (collecting relevant circuit cases).
116. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (“[I]t is the State’s affirmative act of
restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty—
which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process
Clause.” (emphasis added)).
117. See id. at 201 (“While the State may have been aware of the dangers
that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it
do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.” (emphasis added)).
118. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Government Duty to Protect: Post-DeShaney
Developments, 19 TOURO L. REV. 679, 683 (2003) (“DeShaney is the touchstone
for all subsequent discussions about the affirmative duty to provide protection
under due process.”).
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holding,119 expressing its “reluctan[ce] to expand the concept of
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and openended.”120 Expanding due process through judicial decisions
creates the risk that the judiciary’s policy preferences will define
the scope of protected liberties.121
Despite the Court’s self-imposed restraint, it has not scaled
back established affirmative duties. Since DeShaney, the
Supreme Court has reiterated that affirmative duties exist in the
enumerated and recognized contexts of formal confinement—
prisons, pre-trial detainees, arrestees, and “persons in mental
institutions.”122 The functional custody and state-created danger
exceptions identified in DeShaney give plaintiffs alternative
avenues for holding the government constitutionally liable for a
private harm.123
In the years since DeShaney came down, circuit courts have
fashioned different variations on the functional custody and
state-created danger exceptions.

119. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126–27 (1992)
(ruling that the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty on
municipalities to provide minimal safety levels for employees); Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 773 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling it
“perfectly clear” that the Constitution imposes no general obligation on the state
to provide police protection).
120. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720 (1997) (asserting the importance of judicial restraint, because “[b]y
extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to
a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action”).
121. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (calling substantive due process a “treacherous field for this Court” and
arguing that “history counsels caution and restraint” in identifying new
substantive liberty interests).
122. Collins, 503 U.S. at 127.
123. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO
L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (reviewing the theories available for establishing that the
government owes an individual an affirmative duty after DeShaney).
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1. The Functional Custody Exception

DeShaney suggests that a state acquires an affirmative duty
to care for and protect an individual when the state acts to
restrain that person’s liberty.124 Most circuits have subsequently
interpreted this language in DeShaney as establishing
affirmative duties when a state takes “functional custody”125 over
an individual.126
Circuits generally apply the functional custody exception and
find an affirmative duty to protect when the state “affirmatively
places the individual in a position of danger [that] the individual
would not have otherwise faced.”127 Some circuits explicitly
require an element of involuntariness: the state must have taken
custody over the individual against his will.128 The level of control
124. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
200 (1989) (“[I]t is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s
freedom to act on his own behalf—through incarceration, institutionalization, or
other similar restraint of personal liberty—which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’
triggering the [duty].” (emphasis added)).
125. Many courts and scholars refer to the situation in which a state
restricts an individual’s liberty through an affirmative act as a “special
relationship.” See, e.g., Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir.
2011) (stating that DeShaney creates a “special relationship exception” when a
state restricts a person’s liberty such that the person cannot protect himself). To
avoid confusion with the special-relationship doctrine that arose under
Martinez—which DeShaney explicitly rejects—this Note uses the term
“functional custody” to denote situations in which a state’s action restricts a
person’s liberty and thereby creates a constitutional obligation for the state to
protect that person. See supra notes 57, 90–92 and accompanying text
(reviewing the special-relationship exception after Martinez and DeShaney’s
subsequent rejection of this doctrine).
126. See SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 115, at 40 (discussing functional
custody).
127. Wallace v. Adkins, 115 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 1997). See also Armigo v.
Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[L]iability may
attach to a state actor for the violence of a third party if the state restrained the
plaintiff’s personal liberty and that restraint hindered the plaintiff’s freedom to
act to protect himself.”).
128. See Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating
that functional custody requires that the state’s action be “involuntary or
against his will” (internal citations omitted)). See also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 7–8, Kovacic v. Villarreal, No. 10-1235, 2011 WL 1393814, at *7–8
(Mar. 8, 2011) (requesting clarification on the “swirling, murky waters” of
functional custody doctrine), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2995 (2011).
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a state exercises may also affect this analysis, as circuits
sometimes hinge functional custody on whether the individual
“depend[ed] completely on the state to satisfy [his] basic human
needs” and the state’s action prevented other sources of care.129
Individuals have asserted claims based on functional custody
in various circumstances and found varying success. Most circuits
recognize the state’s act of placing a child in foster care to be
sufficient for establishing affirmative duties.130 By contrast, state
laws mandating school attendance usually fail to establish
functional custody—meaning that public schools do not owe
affirmative duties to students—because the attendance laws do
not sufficiently restrain the child.131
129. Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 733 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 914 (1993).
130. See Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 175
(4th Cir. 2010) (“We now hold that when a state involuntarily removes a child
from her home, thereby taking the child into its custody and care, the state has
taken an affirmative act to restrain the child’s liberty, triggering the
[affirmative] protections of the Due Process Clause.”); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d
798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[W]hen [a] state places a child in stateregulated foster care, the state has entered into a special relationship with that
child which imposes upon it certain affirmative duties.”); Norfleet ex rel.
Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[A]
special custodial relationship . . . was created by the state when it took [a child]
from his caregiver and placed him in foster care.”); Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v.
N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 892–93 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding a
clearly established right for foster children to be placed in safe conditions); K.H.
ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1990) (determining that
states owe affirmative duties to foster children, reasoning that “[o]nce the state
assumes custody of a person, it owes him a rudimentary duty of safekeeping no
matter how perilous his circumstances when he was free”); Meador v. Cabinet
for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[D]ue process extends the
right to be free from the infliction of unnecessary harm to children in stateregulated foster homes.”).
131. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel.
Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 857 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“We reaffirm, then,
decades of binding precedent: a public school does not have a DeShaney
special relationship with its students requiring the school to ensure the
students’ safety from private actors.”); Hasenfaus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d
68, 73–74 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that compulsory attendance laws did
not create an obligation for a school to protect a student from suicide);
Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 732–33 (“Th[e] amount of freedom on the part of the
student and the degree of parental involvement and control necessarily
dictate that the state does not become the primary caretaker simply by
mandating compulsory school attendance.”). But while compulsory
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2. The State-Created Danger Exception

Most circuits also interpret DeShaney as acknowledging a
“state-created danger exception.”132 This doctrine holds that a
state assumes affirmative duties to protect a person when the
state itself creates or increases the danger that ultimately causes
the person’s harm.133 This theory of liability predated DeShaney
in some circuits. Judge Posner, who articulated the conception of
the Constitution as a “charter of negative liberties,” pointed out
an oft-quoted “snake pit” exception: “[I]f the state puts a man in a
position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect
him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it

attendance laws may not create a uniform duty for schools to protect all
students, some circuits have refused to adopt the opposite rule—that schools
will never be constitutionally obligated to protect students from private harm.
See Hasenfaus, 175 F.3d at 72
If [a student] had suffered a heart attack in the classroom, and the
teacher knew of her peril, could the teacher merely leave her there to
die without summoning help? If a six-year old child fell down an
elevator shaft, could the school principal ignore the matter? Of
course, school officials might be held liable in tort for such omissions,
but common law liability aside, we hesitate to say for certain that
substantive due process plays no role.
132. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Booker, No. 11-1583, 2012 WL 6604196, at *4
(10th Cir. Dec. 19, 2012); Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 109 (1st Cir. 2005)
(stating that a government actor may be liable if he creates a danger through an
affirmative act); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 651 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“We . . . hold[] that, under the State endangerment concept, an individual
can assert a substantive due process right to protection by the District of
Columbia from third-party violence when District of Columbia officials
affirmatively act to increase or create the danger that ultimately results in the
individual’s harm.”). The Fifth Circuit has rejected the state-created danger
exception. Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299, 307 (5th Cir. 2004). The
First Circuit has discussed and apparently recognized the doctrine, but never
found resulting liability. See Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir.
2005) (discussing the status of the state-created danger doctrine within the
circuit). The Fourth Circuit has also discussed the doctrine, but limits
affirmative duties to facts involving some degree of custody. See Pinder v.
Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“This Court has
consistently read DeShaney to require a custodial context before any affirmative
duty can arise under the Due Process Clause.”).
133. See Chemerinsky, supra note 123, at 3 (stating that circuits continue
developing the state-created danger doctrine).
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is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a
snake pit.”134
No uniform test for state-created danger has developed, and
the Supreme Court, at this point, has declined to weigh in.135
While circuits have crafted slightly different tests for what
circumstances constitute state-created danger, their tests
generally share several elements: (1) the state, through some
affirmative action, created or increased a risk of harm; (2) the
plaintiff—as opposed to the general public—must have been
rendered more vulnerable to the harm; (3) the state must have
known, or reasonably should have known, about the danger; and
(4) the state’s conduct must shock the conscience.136
Circuits continue to settle the general contours of both the
state-created danger and functional custody exceptions. Context
clearly plays a central role in both exceptions, and the context of
voluntary psychiatric hospitalization raises unique concerns, as
discussed in the next Part.

134. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). Another frequently
cited illustration from Judge Posner explains, “The state, having saved a man
from a lynch mob, cannot then lynch him, on the ground that he will be no worse
off than if he had not been saved.” K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846,
849 (7th Cir. 1990).
135. See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 324–25 (5th Cir.
2002) (reviewing different approaches taken by sister circuits).
136. See, e.g., Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281–82 (3d Cir.
2006) (laying out the circuit’s test and emphasizing that the state must have
misused—rather than failed to use—its authority); Armijo v. Wagon Mound
Pub. Schs. 159 F.3d 1253, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[P]laintiff must show:
(1) the charged state actors created the danger or increased the plaintiff’s
vulnerability; (2) the plaintiff [belonged to] a limited and specifically definable
group; (3) the defendants’ conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious,
immediate, and proximate harm; (4) the risk was obvious or known.”); Kallstrom
v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1067 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that states
assume affirmative duties “by substantially increasing the likelihood that a
private actor would deprive [an individual] of their liberty interest in personal
security”); Mitchell v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 107 F.3d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“In order for a plaintiff to hold the state liable under the ‘special danger’
analysis, he must show that the state affirmatively placed him in a position of
danger which was distinguishable from that of the general public.”).
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III. The Landscape of Mental Health Law and Public Psychiatric
Hospitalization
This Part begins by reviewing the general laws governing
voluntary and involuntary hospitalization. Then, it discusses
forces that transformed state hospitals in the last several
decades, affecting the voluntary-hospitalization context.
A. The Current Law of Voluntary and Involuntary Admissions
Patients with acute mental health needs137 can be admitted
to a psychiatric facility in a variety of ways.138 If the individual
137. This Note addresses “civil” mental health patients, as opposed to
“forensic” patients who are committed to state hospitals through the criminal
judicial system. Although beyond this Note’s scope, forensic patients represent a
growing portion of state-hospital populations, and this trend impacts the statehospital system generally. Infra notes 181–85 and accompanying text.
138. For the provisions of each state’s statute governing inpatient mental
health treatment, see 22 ALA. CODE ch. 52, art. 1 (2012); 47 ALASKA STAT. ch. 30,
arts. 8–9 (2012); 36 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 5 (2012); 20 ARK. CODE ANN. ch. 47,
subch. 2 (2012); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE div. 5 pt. 1, div. 6 pt. 1, ch. 1 (2012); 27
COLO. REV. STAT. art. 65 (2012); 17A CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 319I, pt. II (2012); 16
DEL. CODE ANN. chs. 50–51 (2012); 21 D.C. CODE ch. 5 (2012); XXIX FLA. STAT.
ch. 394, pt. 1 (2012); 37 GA. CODE ANN. ch. 3, arts. 1–2 (2012); 19 HAW. REV.
STAT. ch. 334, pts. IV–V (2012); 66 IDAHO CODE ANN. ch. 3 (2012); 405 ILL. COMP.
STAT. Act 5, ch. 3 (2012); 12 IND. CODE art. 26 (2012); VI IOWA CODE ch. 229
(2012); 59 KAN. STAT. ANN. Art. 29 (2012); XVII KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 202A
(2012); 28 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 1, part III (2012); 34-B ME. REV. STAT. ch. 3,
subch. 4 (2012); 10 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. subtits. 6–8 (2012); XVII
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123 (2012); 330 MICH. COMP. LAWS ch. 4 (2012); MINN.
STAT. ch. 253B (2012); 41 MISS. CODE ANN. ch. 21 (2012); XL MO. REV. STAT. ch.
632 (2012); 53 MONT. CODE ANN. ch. 21 (2012); 71 NEB. REV. STAT. art. 9 (2012);
39 NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 433A (2012); X N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 135-C (2012); 30
N.J. STAT. ANN. subtit. 1, ch. 4, art. 3 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 43, art. 1
(2012); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW ch. 27, tit. B, art. 9 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch.
122C, art. 5 (2012); 25 N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 25-03.1 (2012); LI OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. ch. 5122 (2012); 43a OKLA. STAT. ch. 1, § 5 (2012); 35 OR. REV. STAT. ch. 426
(2012); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ch. 15 (2012); 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 5 (2012); 44 S.C.
CODE ANN. ch. 17 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ch. 27a (2012); 33 TENN. CODE
ANN. ch. 6 (2012); 7 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. subtit. C (2012); 62a
UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 15, pt. 6 (2012); 18 VT. STAT. ANN. pt. 8 (2012); 37.2 VA.
CODE ANN. subtit. III (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05 (2012); W.V. CODE ch.
27, arts. 1, 4–5 (2012); WIS. STAT. ch. 51 (2012); 25 WYO. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, art. 1
(2012).
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agrees to the admission and gives informed consent, then he
may be admitted voluntarily.139
Voluntary patients can be further subdivided into two
categories: pure voluntary or conditional voluntary. Under a
“pure” or “informal” voluntary admission, a patient can leave
the hospital whenever he chooses.140 This freedom to walk out of
the hospital may compromise therapeutic interventions, and so
states often restrict pure voluntary admissions either by law or
by policy and favor “conditional” or “formal” voluntary
admissions.141 Typically, a formally voluntary patient who
requests to leave the facility may be detained for a statutorily
defined period—usually a few days—during which time the
clinical staff evaluates whether the patient requires involuntary
commitment.142 Based on this evaluation, clinical staff may
institute involuntary commitment proceedings if warranted, and
otherwise must discharge the patient once the statutory holding
period elapses.143

139. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43 (noting that all states
currently allow voluntary admission).
140. Id. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1412 (2012) (“An informal
voluntary patient shall be allowed to terminate his hospitalization and leave the
hospital at any time during the normal day shift hours of the hospital, and the
hospital shall so inform the patient at the time he is hospitalized.”).
141. APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43. See, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 330.1411 (restricting informal voluntary hospitalizations by requiring
that “the hospital director consider[] the individual to be clinically suitable for
that form of hospitalization”).
142. APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43. For examples of state
statutes allowing voluntary patients to be prevented from leaving the state
hospital at will for a specific period of time, see ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.685 (2012)
(48-hour hold); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-519(B) (2012) (24-hour hold, excluding
weekends and holidays); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-506(a) (2012) (3-day hold); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5123(d) (2012) (5-day hold); FLA. STAT. § 394.4625(2)(a)(2)
(2012) (3-day hold, excluding holidays and weekends); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-322(a) (2012) (72-hour hold, excluding Sundays and legal holidays); 405 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/3-403 (2012) (5-day hold, excluding weekends and holidays);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1452 (2012) (7-day hold, excluding weekends and
holidays); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4403(c) (2012) (10-day hold); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-10-108 (2012) (24-hour hold).
143. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-519(B); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-506(a);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5123(d)(3); FLA. STAT. § 394.4625(2)(a); 405 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/3-403; 50 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4403(c).
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The term “voluntary” is misleading. These admissions often
involve coercive factors like criminal charges or family
pressures.144 Additionally, not only do the locked doors mean that
voluntary patients are physically restricted from walking out of
the facility, but most voluntary patients are legally restricted
from leaving the hospital at will.145
Alternatively, involuntary civil commitment procedures are
available to hospitalize individuals who either refuse to consent
to treatment or who lack capacity to consent.146 Some baseline
constitutional standards limit state laws.147 States cannot
involuntarily confine an individual simply because he has a
mental illness: commitment requires that a mental illness is
causing a person to pose some danger to himself or to others.148
Civil commitment also demands that a state prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that commitment is appropriate under state
law.149
Within these constitutional constraints, states enact varying
laws. Most states permit emergency commitment based on a
clinical psychiatric evaluation of statutory criteria, allowing for
short-term, temporary hospitalization until a judicial hearing can
be convened.150 Commitment hearings are formal proceedings
144. See RAYMOND L. SPRING ET AL., PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS & LAWYERS:
LAW & THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 374 (2d ed. 1997) (“A high percentage of
‘voluntary’ patients are in the hospital only because of external coercion of some
form.”); Janet A. Gilboy & John R. Schmidt, “Voluntary” Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 66 NW. U. L. REV. 429, 430 (1971) (arguing that voluntary
hospitalization usually involves some degree of coercion).
145. APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 39. See also supra note 142
(collecting state statutes permitting state hospitals to hold voluntary patients
for evaluation after the patient requests to be discharged).
146. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 40–42 (discussing the
history of, and rationales for, civil commitment).
147. See id. at 42–45 (reviewing the standards governing civil commitment).
148. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (“[A] State cannot
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable
of surviving safely in freedom.”).
149. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (ruling that due
process demands clear and convincing evidence because this standard “strikes a
fair balance between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of
the state”).
150. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 42–43 (explaining that
emergency commitments vary in length from two days to three weeks and
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where judicial officers preside and patients are afforded some due
process rights.151 State laws on involuntary commitment
standards require different levels of “dangerousness” caused by a
mental illness. Substantively, these laws generally encompass
three elements: (1) the individual has a mental illness; (2) the
individual is dangerous; and (3) the individual needs
treatment.152 Some states are increasing commitment standards
providing information on different clinical and evidentiary requirements under
state law to institute emergency commitment). See, e.g., ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 36535(B) (2012) (6 business days); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-502(a) (2012) (15 days);
GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-62 (2012) (15 days); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-706 (2012) (5
days).
151. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43 (explaining that in the
vast majority of states, judges—rather than administrative officers or juries—
decide civil commitment hearings). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-505
(2012) (guaranteeing patients an independent evaluation of their condition);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.4 (2012) (guaranteeing patients counsel, the
right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examination); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 37-3-1(8) (2012) (requiring that patients have “effective assistance of counsel,”
that hearings be recorded, and giving patients subpoena power, among other
procedural rights); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-631 (2012) (requiring
that involuntarily admitted patients receive notice in plain language informing
them of their rights to consult counsel, and requiring that if the patient cannot
understand the notice contents, his parent, guardian, or next-of-kin receive the
information).
152. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43–45 (reviewing the
differences among state civil commitment laws). For specific examples of state
statutes setting forth the requirements for involuntary civil commitment, see
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 5001, 5010 (2012) (requiring that mental illness
“renders [a] person unable to make responsible decisions with respect to the
person’s hospitalization” and that the person pose “a real and present threat” of
harm without immediate hospitalization); FLA. STAT. § 394.4667(1) (2012)
(requiring serious mental illness and either that the person pose a harm to
himself or others, or that he is unable to function in the community); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 334-60.2 (2012) (requiring that the person “is imminently dangerous to
self or others, is gravely disabled or is obviously ill”); KY. STAT. § 202A.026
(2012) (requiring that the person present either a danger or threat of danger to
self or others, and can reasonably benefit from treatment); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH–GEN. § 10-632(g) (2012) (requiring a “mental disorder,” which requires
inpatient care, and that the person “present[] a danger to the life or safety of the
individual or of others”); MICH. COMP. LAW § 330-1401 (2012) (defining “person
requiring treatment” to include an individual who, because of mental illness,
cannot attend to his basic needs, or who cannot understand his need for
treatment, is treatment noncompliant, and has consequently been violent or
been placed in psychiatric facilities, prison, or jail twice in past forty-eight
months).
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by demanding proof of some threat, attempt, or actual occurrence
of harm.153
States continue to develop laws governing civil commitment.
For example, most states have adopted “outpatient commitment”
laws, which require certain patients to comply with psychiatric
treatment in the community.154 As states rework the laws
governing commitment, the context of voluntary hospitalization
evolves.155
B. The Historical Context of Mental Health Law and
Hospitalization
Mental health law and public hospitalization should be
understood in historical context.156 Sovereigns have confined
mentally ill persons for centuries.157 At common law, the
153. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43 (explaining that
heightened proof standards are intended to make the commitment
determination an objective decision).
154. See id. at 48 (discussing outpatient commitment laws). Only a few
states use these laws regularly because most states lack needed clinical and
administrative structures at this time. Id. The criteria for which individuals
qualify for outpatient commitment vary; some states require a high likelihood
that a patient will relapse into acute symptoms, while other states require a
pattern of dangerousness. Id. For examples of state statutes governing
outpatient commitment orders and standards, see ALA. CODE §§ 22-52-10.2
to -10.3 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 394.4655 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-3-90, 37-3-93
(2012) (permitting courts to order outpatient commitment for one-year periods if
a physician concludes from examination that an individual “is a mentally ill
person requiring involuntary treatment” and outpatient treatment is available);
50 PA. CON. STAT. § 4406(b) (2012) (“[A] court may permit partial hospitalization
or outpatient care, or if at any time thereafter the director shall determine such
partial hospitalization or outpatient care to be beneficial to the person so
committed, the same may be permitted by said court upon application by the
director.”).
155. See JOHN Q. LAFOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE
FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 53–56 (1992)
(reviewing different proposals for modifying civil commitment law).
156. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW &
THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 12–13 (1994) (arguing that examining the evolution of
mental health laws in recent decades “strengthen[s] our understanding of the
complex interaction of forces involved when the law is applied to the mentally
ill”).
157. See Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and
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government was obligated to “take care of those who could not
take care of themselves.”158 American courts continued applying
this rule, but legal procedures changed as psychiatry evolved.159
In the twentieth century, mental health law and public
psychiatric facilities transformed dramatically with regards to
both the voluntary nature and the total number of admissions.
First, in the twentieth century voluntary admission became
available and popular.160 During the first half of the century,
almost every psychiatric patient was admitted involuntarily.161
Involuntary admissions were preferred for administrative
convenience and a general belief that “the presence of mental
illness per se rendered a person incompetent to consent to
hospitalization.”162 State hospitals were considered important
institutions for social reform, with psychiatric professionals
bestowed significant power over their patients.163
Beginning in the 1950s, psychiatric professionals and
patients’-rights advocates fought to increase voluntary
treatment.164 States responded, dramatically revising the laws
governing admissions.165 By the early 1970s, voluntary
admissions became more common than involuntary admissions.
Currently, most patients are admitted voluntarily when both

Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1288 (1966) [hereinafter Commitment
Theories & Procedures] (discussing involuntary commitment at common law).
158. See, e.g., Beverly’s Case, (1603) 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B.) 1124–26; 4 Co.
Rep. 123 b, 126 a–127 b (discussing the King’s duties to “lunatics” and “idiots”).
159. See Commitment Theories & Procedures, supra note 157, at 1288
(explaining that “lunatics” came to be seen as ill, rather than as cursed).
160. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 38 (“[T]he idea that the
mentally ill might be able to sign themselves into psychiatric hospitals
voluntarily is a relatively new one.”).
161. See id. (“[B]y 1949 only 10% of patients were voluntarily admitted [to
psychiatric hospitals].”). No state permitted voluntarily admission until 1881.
Id.
162. Id.
163. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 155, at 84 (stating that before civil
rights reforms, state actors could “make virtually all decisions for patients”).
164. See id. (explaining that civil libertarians opposed involuntary
confinement, while psychiatrists favored voluntary admissions because they led
to more effective treatment).
165. Id.
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private and public/state hospitals are considered.166 Some states
even adopted statutory presumptions or policy statements
encouraging voluntary—rather than involuntary—admission and
treatment.167 In state hospitals, however, involuntary admissions
have recently become more common than voluntary.168
Second, in the late-twentieth century the number of state
hospital beds—and subsequently, the number of state-hospital
patients—declined dramatically. In the mid-1950s, over 500,000
mentally ill persons sat “warehoused” in state institutions for
years without effective treatment and lacking a mechanism to
obtain release.169 By 2003, the number of state hospital beds had
fallen by over 90%, down to 40,000 beds.170
Deinstitutionalization grew from a combination of factors:
changing societal attitudes about institutionalization; financial
incentives to treat people in the community; new antipsychotic
medications, allowing outpatient treatment; new federal
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.655(1) (2012) (“Persons [should] be given
every reasonable opportunity to accept voluntary treatment before involvement
with the judicial system.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-101(d) (2012) (declaring
that the legislature intends to “encourage the use of voluntary rather than
coercive measures to provide treatment and care”).
168. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 155, at 43 (noting the trend); see
also infra notes 183–84 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship
between deinstitutionalization and involuntary admissions, as well as the effect
on the patient populations in state hospitals).
169. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 155, at 85 (describing “inhumane
conditions in mental hospitals” in the 1940s).
170. See Ronald W. Manderscheld, Joanne E. Atay & Raquel A. Crider,
Changing Trends in State Hospital Use from 2002–2005, 60 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1, 1 (2009) (discussing trends in state hospitals). In 2011, only 145,065
total adults received inpatient treatment in state hospitals—a number higher
than the number of beds because it accounts for patients who were discharged
and whose beds were filled by a subsequent admission. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE &
MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., ALABAMA 2011 MENTAL HEALTH NATIONAL
OUTCOME MEASURES (NOMS): CMHS UNIFORM REPORTING SYSTEM 9 (2011),
http://www.samhsa.gov/dataoutcomes/urs/2011/Alabama.pdf (listing the total
number of adults treated in state psychiatric hospitals throughout the United
States in 2011). For data on each state in 2011, see 2011 CMHS Uniform
Reporting System Output Tables, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., http://www.samhsa.gov/dataoutcomes/urs/urs2011.aspx (last visited
Feb. 3, 2013) (linking to each state’s uniform data for 2011, and comparing state
data to national data) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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legislation aimed at building outpatient treatment centers; and
civil liberties lawyers’ advocacy.171 The civil liberties lawyers
facilitated deinstitutionalization through several key lawsuits
challenging hospital conditions and commitment procedures.172
These suits facially addressed civil rights violations in state
hospitals, but were actually “targeted at closing down the
hospitals.”173
Deinstitutionalization caused “staggering” effects on the
mentally ill population and mental health services.174 Although a
full understanding of deinstitutionalization is beyond the scope of
this Note, one important effect is relevant: The availability of
state psychiatric hospitalization declined dramatically.175 States
have slashed the number of state hospital beds.176 Because beds
are scarce, states limit admission to patients with the severest
symptoms.177 The structure of healthcare funding for psychiatric
171. See Jeffrey L. Geller, The Last Half-Century of Psychiatric Services as
Reflected in PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 41, 42–58 (2000)
(providing a comprehensive overview of factors causing deinstitutionalization);
see also Community Mental Health Centers Act, Pub. L. No. 88-164, tit. II, 77
Stat. 282, 290–94 (1963) (allocating federal funding to states that established
agencies for administering outpatient mental health care).
172. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (ruling that civil
commitment requires the patient be dangerous and unable to live safely in the
community); Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1313–14 (5th Cir. 1974)
(upholding injunction ordering Alabama state hospitals to improve the condition
and staffing ratios).
173. See E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: HOW AMERICA’S FAILURE
TO TREAT THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 4 (2008) (noting
that many states responded to Wyatt and O’Connor by discharging patients).
174. Id. at 50.
175. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., FUNDING &
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH AGENCIES 69 (2009) [hereinafter
SAMHSA FUNDING REPORT] (discussing the trend in most states to decrease
state hospital services).
176. Id. One effect of deinstitutionalization is that many people with severe
mental illness are now institutionalized in prisons and jails rather than
hospitals. See GRANT H. MORRIS, REFUSING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE: COERCED
TREATMENT OF MENTALLY DISORDERED PERSONS 150–51 (2006) (stating that
approximately 283,000 people with mental illness were incarcerated in a 1998
study—often for petty crimes—meaning that jails have become the largest
mental health providers in the country).
177. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 155, at 51–52 (describing how
deinstitutionalization and the consequent shortage of state hospital services
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services encourages this practice by covering a predetermined
amount of care in private facilities.178 State governments bear the
entire cost of patients’ treatment in state hospitals, incentivizing
states not to admit patients with available insurance coverage
into the state-funded public facilities.179 As a result, the sickest
individuals—those who run out of covered inpatient services—are
more likely to be admitted to state hospitals.180
The legal system also caused changes in state hospitals. State
hospitals are also devoting more beds to forensic patients who
come from the criminal system.181 In 2008, one-third of statehospital patients had been criminally committed to the hospital.182
State psychiatric hospitals also recently witnessed a dramatic rise
in the proportion of involuntarily committed patients, a trend that
contrasts with the general rise of voluntary admissions noted
above.183 The trend back to involuntary commitment in state
hospitals stems from increasing forensic populations and general
goals underlying deinstitutionalization.184 The proportional rise of
involuntary patients indicates a corollary rise in the proportion of
patients posing a risk of harm—a necessary precondition to
involuntary commitment. State hospitals, then, face more violent
patient populations.185
The state hospital today differs sharply from the state
hospital in previous decades.186 The sweeping reforms, sharp
caused a heightened threshold for determining which individuals are admitted
to state institutions).
178. See John Petrila, Ethics, Money, and the Problem of Coercion: Coercion
in Managed Behavioral Health Care, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 359, 370–71 (1996)
(discussing the impact of mental health coverage on public hospitals).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See SAMHSA FUNDING REPORT, supra note 175, at 71 (stating that
between 1993 and 2007, state hospital expenditures for forensic services
increased from 10.7% to 36%).
182. Id.
183. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 155, at 43 (suggesting a trend
toward involuntary admissions in state hospitals).
184. Id. (explaining that in some states, public hospitals serve only
involuntary patients in order to keep the patient census low).
185. Id. at 53.
186. See William H. Fisher, Jeffrey L. Geller & John A. Pandiani, The

SHELTERING PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS

757

budget cuts, and concentration of more violent and more acutely
ill patients suggest that courts should carefully guard patients’
rights. But voluntary patients’ rights are murky, with circuits
divided on how to properly analyze affirmative duties.187
IV. Circuit Split over Affirmative Duties to Voluntary Patients
This distinction between patients admitted voluntarily
versus involuntarily bears significance beyond just criteria for
admission or discharge. Courts use this voluntary/involuntary
distinction to determine whether the state owes a particular
patient Youngberg rights, but the circuits disagree on how to
properly analyze voluntary patients’ rights.188 This circuit split
predates DeShaney, but since DeShaney was handed down, that
decision drives the train in courts’ analyses.189 This Part
examines two broad approaches that circuit courts take. First,
several circuits look solely to a patient’s formal status as a
voluntary or involuntary patient.190 Second, other circuits
scrutinize the facts in each case, looking at the circumstances of a
patient’s hospitalization to determine whether the patient’s
commitment was voluntary or involuntary.191

Changing Role of the State Psychiatric Hospital, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 676, 676–81
(arguing that state hospitals evolved from being the primary treatment source
for the mentally ill, and now primarily manage those people who cannot be
managed elsewhere). The authors identify four groups of patients whom they
predict will likely “define the state hospital’s mission for the foreseeable future”:
(1) people with criminal justice histories; (2) forensic patients; (3) sexually
dangerous persons; and (4) patients who are difficult to discharge, often because
of the severity of their illness. Id. at 679–80.
187. See infra Part IV (discussing the circuit split).
188. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (stating Youngberg’s rule that
involuntarily committed mental health patients are owed certain affirmative
duties); Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 682 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting the
circuit split on whether states owe affirmative duties to voluntary patients).
189. See Lanman, 529 F.3d at 682 n.1 (discussing the circuit split both
before and after DeShaney).
190. See infra Part IV.A (reviewing cases applying status-based tests).
191. See infra Part IV.B (reviewing cases applying fact-based tests).
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A. A Status-Based Approach to Affirmative Duties

One group of circuit courts applies the general no-duty rule
broadly when voluntary patients bring Youngberg-type claims
premised on affirmative duties of care or protection.192 Basing
their affirmative-duty analysis on the patients’ formal admission
status, these circuits interpret DeShaney to preclude affirmative
duties for everyone except civilly committed patients.193
1. Sixth Circuit: Higgs v. Latham194
The Sixth Circuit applied a status-based analysis focused on
the voluntary/involuntary distinction in Higgs v. Latham.195
Josephine Higgs was admitted to Western State Hospital in
complicated circumstances. Josephine was initially a patient at
Grayson County Hospital.196 Her husband observed her mental
illness worsening during her treatment at Grayson, he petitioned
a court to order Josephine to be involuntarily hospitalized at
Western State, and the court granted this order.197 Pursuant to
this order, Josephine was transported via ambulance from
Grayson to Western State, and was strapped down due to state
officials’ concern that she would harm herself.198 Upon arriving at
Western State, however, Josephine was allowed to sign herself in
as a voluntary patient because the Western State staff were
192. See infra notes 222–57 and accompanying text (discussing cases
highlighting the status-based analysis applied in the Sixth, First, and Fifth
Circuits).
193. See infra notes 207, 234, 236, and 257 and accompanying text
(discussing these circuits’ interpretations of DeShaney as limiting affirmative
duties to formally committed patients).
194. Higgs v. Latham, No. 91-5273, 1991 WL 216464, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct. 24,
1991) (per curiam) (affirming the district court’s ruling that the state owed no
affirmative duties to a patient who was sent to a hospital under judicial order,
but admitted voluntarily due to a communication error in the emergency room).
195. Id.
196. Id. at *1, *5. The opinion provides scant information about the Grayson
hospitalization; it is unclear whether Josephine was voluntarily admitted or
whether this hospitalization was for psychiatric or medical treatment.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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never informed about the prior court proceeding.199 Had the
hospital known about the court order, it would not have allowed
Josephine to sign in as a voluntary patient.200 After Josephine
was admitted, another patient sexually assaulted her, prompting
Josephine and her husband to bring this § 1983 suit for monetary
and injunctive relief.201 The case first went before a magistrate
judge, who denied the State’s motion for summary judgment,
finding a genuine factual dispute over whether Josephine was, in
fact, a voluntary patient.202 The district court reversed, granting
summary judgment to the State on the grounds that Josephine
was a voluntary patient with no constitutional right to
affirmative care and protection.203
The Sixth Circuit agreed that Josephine, as a voluntary
patient, had no positive rights.204 The court began by analyzing
Youngberg and DeShaney.205 The court interpreted Youngberg as
concluding that involuntary patients have affirmative rights, but
as silent regarding voluntary patients.206 DeShaney, however,
does apply to voluntary patients, and under DeShaney,
affirmative duties depend “on the kind of restraint that disables a
person from caring for himself.”207 Applied to this case, the court
reasoned that the state’s court order did not amount to an actual
restraint because it was “unexecuted and unknown” to the
hospital.208 For the hospital to take on affirmative duties, the
hospital must have restrained Josephine.209 And because the
199. Id. at *1–2.
200. See id. at *1 (containing the testimony about the admission
procedures).
201. Id.
202. Id. at *2.
203. Id.
204. See id. at *4 (“If the district court was correct in concluding that Mrs.
Higgs was a voluntary patient at Western State Hospital, then it follows that
she had no constitutionally based right of action against any of the
defendants.”).
205. See id. at *2–4 (examining these cases).
206. Id. at *2.
207. Id. at *3.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *4.
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hospital did not know about the court order and because
Josephine signed voluntary admission papers, “there was no
‘affirmative act’ by the hospital to deprive her of liberty,” and so
the state’s duty-to-protect was never triggered.210
The majority rejected Josephine’s arguments that she was
not competent to be voluntarily admitted and that hospital staff
coerced her into signing the voluntary paperwork.211 First,
regarding Josephine’s “allegedly confused state of mind,” the
court refused to engage in this “highly problematic exploration of
the state of mind of an acutely ill mental patient.”212 Second, the
court rejected arguments that “advice” given by a nurse at
Grayson that “it would be better for [Josephine] to admit herself
voluntarily to Western State rather than being involuntarily
committed there” amounted to constructive confinement.213
Judge Suhrheinrich concurred in the ruling but disagreed
with the majority’s analysis of the voluntary/involuntary
distinction,214 arguing that the majority misinterpreted
DeShaney.215 To start, Judge Suhrheinrich contended that
“DeShaney [does not] control the outcome of this case.”216 First,
DeShaney does not preclude voluntary patients from establishing
claims based on functional custody or on state-created danger.217
With respect to functional custody, Judge Suhrheinrich suggested
that affirmative duties may have been triggered on the several
occasions when Josephine requested to leave Western State, “and
permission was refused.”218 With respect to state-created danger,
affirmative duties may have been triggered when she was courtordered for temporary commitment, given that Josephine
probably would not have gone to Western State or signed
210. Id.
211. See id. at *4–5 (discussing Josephine’s claims that her admission was
not voluntary).
212. Id. at *5.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *6 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See id. (“DeShaney’s custody test for liability may therefore be met even
after it is shown that a patient was voluntarily admitted.”).
218. Id. at *6 n.1.
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voluntary admission papers otherwise.219 Overall, the concurrence
is noteworthy for its recommendation that voluntary patients
should be able to make out affirmative-duty claims based on
functional custody or state-created danger.220
2. First Circuit: Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Center221
The First Circuit adopted a restrictive approach similar to the
Higgs majority in Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Center.222 Mr.
Monahan was a voluntary patient at a state-operated group home
called Millie’s Cottage.223 On the day the injury occurred, Mr.
Monahan, accompanied by Cottage staff, went to a hospital
emergency room and was evaluated for possible admission.224 The
hospital staff determined that inpatient treatment was unnecessary
and that he could return to the Cottage.225 While state employees
were driving him back from the emergency room, Mr. Monahan
jumped out of the car and walked toward an interstate highway.226
The driver, a state employee, did not call the police or try to stop Mr.
Monahan; instead, he drove back to the group home and called a
hospital, sending two other state employees to look for Mr.
Monahan.227 During this time, a car struck Mr. Monahan,
causing serious injury.228 Mr. Monahan then sued state officials
for injunctive and compensatory relief stemming from his
injuries, claiming they violated a duty to provide adequate
219. Id.
220. Id. at *6 (“DeShaney compels us to go beyond asking whether Higgs
was a voluntary admittee. DeShaney demands that we examine the limitations
imposed on Higgs while she was a resident at the state hospital.”).
221. Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987, 991 (1st Cir.
1992) (ruling that a voluntary patient had no constitutional right to protection
because the state did not restrict his liberties through civil commitment
procedures).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 988.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 988–89.
227. Id. at 989.
228. Id.
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supervision and treatment.229 The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and also
denied Mr. Monahan’s motion to submit an amended
complaint.230 Mr. Monahan appealed to the First Circuit.231
In analyzing whether the state had violated any duty to Mr.
Monahan, the First Circuit examined the relationship between
the patient and the state. The facts differ from Youngberg
because Mr. Monahan was not involuntarily committed.232 The
facts also differ from DeShaney because Mr. Monahan was living
in a state-operated facility, rather than a private home.233 Despite
these differences from DeShaney’s facts, the court applied
DeShaney’s rationale—that the Due Process Clause does not
generally impose affirmative duties—and determined that the
state had assumed no such duty.234 “Because the state did not
commit Monahan involuntarily, it did not take an ‘affirmative act’
of restraining his liberty.”235
The court rejected Mr. Monahan’s arguments that
DeShaney’s exceptions for functional custody or state-created
danger applied, basing its rejection on Mr. Monahan’s voluntary
status. First, while acknowledging that a state assumes
affirmative duties when it uses coercive measures to restrict an
individual’s liberty,236 the court determined that the state had not
coerced Mr. Monahan because it had not initiated formal
commitment proceedings.237 The court must look to whether the
state’s affirmative actions caused Mr. Monahan to give up some
liberties.238 Mr. Monahan’s mental illness—not the state—
229. Id.
230. See id. at 990 (discussing the history in the lower court).
231. Id.
232. See id. (comparing the instant case to Youngberg).
233. See id. (“His relationship to the state was therefore considerably closer
than that of the plaintiff in DeShaney.”).
234. See id. at 990–91 (stating that under DeShaney, Mr. Monahan “failed to
state a viable claim for denial of substantive due process”).
235. Id. at 991.
236. See id. at 992 n.5 (interpreting DeShaney’s language to mean that
“where the state’s coercive power is not involved, there can be no constitutional
(as opposed to tort) right to careful treatment”).
237. Id. at 992.
238. Id. Although the circuit had ruled in pre-DeShaney cases that
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deprived him of his liberty.239 Second, the state-created danger
argument failed for similar reasons. The state’s actions might
have made Mr. Monahan more vulnerable to harm.240 Again, Mr.
Monahan “voluntarily availed himself of a Commonwealth
service,” and so the state did not take on affirmative duties.241
Overall, then, the circuit’s analysis turned primarily on Mr.
Monahan’s voluntary status—the state owed him no affirmative
duties because the state had not initiated formal commitment
proceedings.
3. Fifth Circuit: Walton v. Alexander242
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted a similar analysis
in Walton v. Alexander.243 Christopher Walton was a voluntary
residential student at the Mississippi School for the Deaf.244
Another student sexually assaulted Christopher several times.245
The state became aware of the first assault and instituted
precautions, such as separating the students into different
dormitories.246 But then budgetary constraints caused the school
to close one of the dormitories and the boys were placed back in
the same building, where the student sexually assaulted
Christopher again.247 The district court denied the defendant’s
voluntary patients might have affirmative constitutional rights because of
severe symptoms or de facto involuntary conditions, the court suggested that
DeShaney demands different analysis. Id.
239. See id. (“His helplessness was not attributable to the [State taking] him
into custody involuntarily.”).
240. See id. at 993 (agreeing with Mr. Monahan’s argument that “the
Commonwealth could plausibly be said to have rendered him more vulnerable to
danger”).
241. See id. (“The Commonwealth did not force Monahan, against his will, to
become dependent on it.”).
242. Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(ruling that a state has no duty to protect persons within its custody unless the
state has taken affirmative steps to involuntarily confine them).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1299.
245. Id. at 1299–1300.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1300.
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motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal, in which a panel
majority held that Superintendent Alexander had a special
relationship with Christopher and, therefore, Christopher was
entitled to Youngberg rights.248 The Fifth Circuit then took up
this interlocutory appeal en banc, reversing the panel majority’s
decision and the district court’s denial of immunity.249
The panel majority had ruled that Christopher was owed
affirmative duties because the state had exercised functional
custody.250 Looking to language in DeShaney suggesting that
states trigger affirmative duties by restraining someone’s liberty
in a manner similar to incarceration, the court examined the
factual setting of Christopher’s relationship to the state.251 Many
facts indicated “a significant custodial component” in this
relationship: Christopher lived at the school; the school enforced
strict rules; Christopher was “not free to leave” the school at will;
and economically, most families had “no other viable option” for
educating handicapped children.252 These facts combined to make
Christopher “dependent on the School for his basic needs and [he]
lost a substantial measure of his freedom to act.”253 The state,
therefore, had functional custody and was obligated to provide
Christopher with a reasonably safe environment.254
The en banc panel disagreed. Summarizing its analysis, the
Fifth Circuit explained, “we have followed [DeShaney’s] language
strictly.”255 If a state has affirmatively exercised its power to take
custody over an individual against his will, then the state
assumes affirmative duties.256 But Christopher had “voluntarily
subjected himself” to the state’s custody and had “the option of
248. See id. (discussing the prior history).
249. Id. at 1299.
250. See Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding an
affirmative duty from functional custody), rev’d en banc, 44 F.3d 1297, 1303 (5th
Cir. 1995) (en banc).
251. See id. (describing the facts that indicate a custodial relationship).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
256. Id.
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leaving at will.”257 Therefore, the state had no affirmative duty to
protect him.258
Judge Parker concurred specially in an opinion joined by
three other circuit judges.259 The concurrence disagreed with
DeShaney’s proper interpretation, asserting that the en banc
majority read DeShaney “erroneously” to require “a bright line
rule that represents an extreme constitutional viewpoint.”260 But
this bright-line rule arbitrarily limits constitutional rights
without accurately reflecting the facts of any given case.261
The concurrence argued that the court should apply a factorbased test assessing the quality and nature of the relationship
between patient and state.262 Reasoning that this test comports
with DeShaney, Judge Parker looked to the DeShaney opinion.263
While DeShaney limited affirmative duties to contexts such as
involuntary commitment and incarceration, the majority was
explicit that “other similar restraint[s] of personal liberty” will
trigger affirmative duties.264 Thus, the concurrence argued, courts

257. See id. at 1305 (analyzing Christopher’s case in light of DeShaney).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1306 (Parker, J., concurring).
260. Id.
261. See id. at 1309 (stating that the majority’s rule arbitrarily assigns
constitutional rights, and providing hypothetical illustrations of how the brightline test fails to reliably and accurately measure state control).
262. See id. at 1309–10
Instead of asking whether a person was taken into custody
involuntarily, we should consider several factors to determine
whether a special relationship exists in a particular case: 1) the
authority and discretion state actors have to control the environment
and behavior of the individuals in their custody, 2) the
responsibilities assumed by the State, 3) the extent to which an
individual in state custody must rely on the State to provide for his or
her basic needs, and 4) the degree of control actually exercised by the
State in a given situation.
263. See id. at 1307–08 (analyzing DeShaney’s majority opinion).
264. Id. (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 200 (1989)). The concurrence pointed out the absurdity created by the
majority’s holding: “[S]tate actors entrusted with the responsibility to care for
and protect our most vulnerable citizens may do so with constitutional
impunity,” while incarcerated “criminals are wrapped in the protective cloak of
the constitution.” Id. at 1310.
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must analyze the restraints on liberty in order to determine
whether constitutional duties are at play.265
The Walton majority, however, like the Monahan and Higgs
courts, determined that affirmative-duty analysis turns on formal
status. These courts interpret DeShaney to require involuntary
commitment procedures before a state takes on affirmative
duties.266 And, as the Higgs and Walton concurrences point out
(albeit, critically),267 these courts avoid a fact-heavy analysis.
Only facts about commitment proceedings are relevant, and the
patient’s formal status is determinative.
B. A Fact-Based Approach to Affirmative Duties
Other circuit courts reject a strict status-based approach,
concluding that voluntary status does not per se preclude
Youngberg rights. Prior to DeShaney, several circuit courts ruled
that voluntary status is irrelevant in these cases.268 After
DeShaney, the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits continue to
look beyond formal voluntary/involuntary labels.

265. Id. at 1310. Applying its test, the concurrence concluded that the state
exercised sufficient control over Christopher to trigger affirmative duties. Id.
However, the concurrence determined that the state actors were not liable
because the plaintiffs failed to prove the state violated its duty by acting with
deliberate indifference. Id. at 1307.
266. See supra notes 207, 235, 256 and accompanying text (discussing how
the First, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits applied DeShaney to require involuntary
commitment).
267. See supra notes 214–20 and accompanying text (summarizing Judge
Suhrheinrich’s concurrence in Higgs); supra notes 259–65 and accompanying
text (summarizing Judge Parker’s concurrence in Walton).
268. See, e.g., Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d
1239, 1246 (2d Cir. 1984) (ruling that patients’ voluntary status is “irrelevant”
in determining whether Youngberg rights apply, reasoning that Youngberg’s
analysis applies equally to voluntary and involuntary patients); Goodman v.
Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1978) (ruling that, although a state
hospital has no obligation to admit anyone, the state owes affirmative duties to
those individuals that it does admit); Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121, 1124 (1st
Cir. 1976) (ruling that a voluntary patient may assert a constitutional right to
affirmative protection by establishing a sufficient level of helplessness).
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1. Eleventh Circuit: Spivey v. Elliot269
The Eleventh Circuit ruled in Spivey v. Elliot270 that whether
a child receiving treatment voluntarily in a state-operated
residential program has Youngberg rights depends on the level of
control the state exercises.271 Tremain Spivey was a residential
student at Georgia’s School of the Deaf, living at the school five
days per week, with his mother’s consent.272 A thirteen-year-old
classmate sexually assaulted Tremain on several occasions.273
Tremain’s mother subsequently withdrew him from the school
and filed a § 1983 suit against the school, claiming that the school
violated its duty to provide a safe environment under
Youngberg.274 The district court granted the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.275
Tremain appealed.276
The Eleventh Circuit issued two opinions responding to the
State’s argument that Tremain had no right to its protection
because he was at the school voluntarily.277 In its first ruling, the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the State, interpreting DeShaney
to mean that a state owes affirmative duties when it exercises
sufficient control and dominion over an individual.278 The control
and dominion requirement might be met whether a patient is
voluntary or involuntary.279 Regarding Tremain’s voluntary
status, “[t]he outcome of the case cannot turn on that

269. Spivey v. Elliot, 29 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1994) (ruling that the
state owed affirmative duties to a voluntary patient under DeShaney’s
functional custody exception).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1523.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1523–24.
275. Id. at 1524.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1526.
278. See id. (“The question is not so much how the individual got into state
custody, but to what extent the State exercises dominion and control over that
individual.”).
279. Id.
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distinction.”280 The court, however, affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the State on qualified immunity
grounds.281
In a later ruling, the court revisited its decision sua sponte,
backing away from its affirmative duty analysis.282 Pointing out
that Tremain’s claim failed on qualified immunity, the court
decided that its affirmative duty analysis was unnecessary and
should not serve as precedent.283 Therefore, while Spivey’s first
ruling—that affirmative duties may be found independently of
the voluntary/involuntary distinction—is not binding, the
analysis is informative as to how the Eleventh Circuit might rule
in the absence of qualified immunity issues.284
2. Eighth Circuit: Kennedy v. Schafer285 and Shelton v. Arkansas
Department of Human Services286
The Eighth Circuit applied an analysis similar to the
Eleventh Circuit’s first Spivey decision in Kennedy v. Schafer.287
280. Id.
281. See id. at 1527 (deciding that the petitioner failed to show that his
constitutional right was clearly established at the time the harm occurred).
282. See Spivey v. Elliot, 41 F.3d 1497, 1498 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Upon
reconsideration on the suggestion of other members of this Court, we now think
it enough to decide that there was no clearly established constitutional right
allegedly violated by the defendants.”).
283. See id. at 1499 (“[T]his panel has chosen to withdraw all of its prior
opinion which relates to whether the complaint alleges a constitutional right.”).
284. The Supreme Court has ruled that courts should analyze whether a
constitutional duty is established before reaching qualified immunity questions.
See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) (discussing the proper structure
of analysis).
285. Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1995) (remanding case
in which voluntarily admitted psychiatric patient committed suicide and
instructing lower court that if based on patient’s condition at time of suicide the
facility could have lawfully detained her, then state had affirmative duty), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996).
286. Shelton v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837, 839, 842 (8th Cir.
2012) (affirming that state owed no affirmative duties when voluntarily
admitted psychiatric patient attempted suicide and, upon finding her alive,
medical staff did not administer mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, leading to the
patient’s death).
287. Kennedy, 71 F.3d. at 295.
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The patient in this case was Kathleen Kennedy, a fifteen-year-old
girl who was admitted voluntarily to Hawthorn Children’s
Psychiatric Hospital in Missouri.288 The hospital knew Kathleen
was suicidal and her clinicians ordered suicide precautions,
requiring that the nursing staff keep Kathleen within their
eyesight.289 About a week after these precautions began, the
hospital unit was short-staffed, and the nursing supervisor
declined to schedule another nurse to work the evening shift.290
That evening, April 8, 1992, the nursing staff did not keep
Kathleen within their eyesight.291 After 2:30 PM, staff did not see
Kathleen for over three hours.292 At 5:10 PM, staff discovered
that Kathleen had committed suicide.293 Her parents sued the
State under § 1983, claiming that the hospital violated its duty to
provide a safe and humane environment.294 The district court
granted summary judgment to the State on the grounds that it
did not owe Kathleen affirmative Youngberg duties because of her
voluntary status, and alternatively on qualified immunity
grounds.295 Kathleen’s parents appealed.296
In analyzing whether the state owed Kathleen such a duty,
the Eighth Circuit focused on the degree of control the state
exercised over Kathleen.297 Its analysis resembles the Eleventh
Circuit’s initial approach in Spivey, which found that Georgia’s
control over Tremain Spivey placed him within DeShaney’s
functional custody exception.298 The Eighth Circuit, however,
288. Id. at 293.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 294.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 293.
297. See id. (agreeing with the Kennedy’s argument that “the amount of
control the state actors . . . exerted over Kathleen’s life” is relevant to whether
affirmative duties exist).
298. See Spivey v. Elliot, 29 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The question
is not so much how the individual got into state custody, but to what extent the
State exercises dominion and control over that individual.”).
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looked to whether Missouri exercised such control over Kathleen
that “she had become, in effect, an involuntary patient.”299
Pointing out that Missouri law restricts patients who pose a
substantial risk of harming themselves from leaving the
hospital,300 and that this statutory language appeared on the
voluntary admission papers Kathleen’s mother had signed, the
court reasoned that Kathleen might not have enjoyed an absolute
right to leave the hospital.301 The court remanded the case for a
factual determination of how much control the state exercised
over Kathleen.302
To support its analysis, the court pointed to DeShaney’s
language that a state owes affirmative duties when it exercises
functional custody, thereby creating a situation “sufficiently
analogous” to involuntary hospitalization.303 It applied this
language, however, not asking whether Kathleen’s situation was
“analogous” to an involuntary patient’s, but by asking whether
Kathleen had, in fact, become an involuntary patient.304 Through
this analytic step, the court explicitly avoided addressing whether
Youngberg might apply to voluntary patients.305 And while the
299. Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292, 296 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1018 (1996).
300. Id. at 295–96. The court arrived at this interpretation of Missouri law
by reading three separate statutory provisions together. First, state statutes
give the hospital discretion to refuse to discharge a minor psychiatric inpatient
who is substantially at risk of harming herself, covering patients at risk for
suicide. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 632.155(2), 632.005(10)(a) (2012). Second, if state
psychiatric workers become aware that any person—including non-patients—is
likely to cause serious harm because of a psychiatric illness, then the state actor
is under a duty to evaluate the person’s condition. Id. § 632.300(1). Third, if the
state actor concludes that this person poses an “imminent” risk of substantial
harm because of a psychiatric illness, then the actor is obligated to initiate
procedures for involuntary hospitalization. Id. § 632.300(2).
301. Kennedy, 71 F.3d at 295.
302. Id. at 296.
303. Id. at 295 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989)).
304. See id. (stating that factors such as Kathleen’s clinical condition and
state law “may have converted her status to that of an involuntary patient”); id.
at 296 (“Facts change, and legal status follows facts.”).
305. Id. at 295 (“[T]his disposition makes it unnecessary to address the
question whether a voluntary mental patient enjoys the same due process
protections as an involuntary patient.”).
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Kennedy court looked beyond Kathleen’s formal status, it
nevertheless grounded its decision on her de facto status as either
a voluntary or an involuntary patient.306
The Eighth Circuit recently revisited its Kennedy decision in
Shelton v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, clarifying
the circuit’s approach to voluntarily admitted patients.307 The
facts in Shelton resemble those in Kennedy, with several key
differences.308 Brenda Shelton signed in as a voluntary patient at
Arkansas State Hospital because she was suicidal.309 The clinical
staff initially placed her on “suicide watch,” but—unlike Kathleen
Kennedy—these precautions were eventually removed.310 Three
days later, nursing staff found Brenda in her room and discovered
that Brenda had hanged herself.311 Brenda was unconscious, but
still alive.312 The clinical staff, however, refused to provide
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.313 Medical equipment that might
have helped revive Brenda was locked in a storage room; the
room was unavailable because a nurse had locked the key inside
the room.314 Brenda died a few days later.315 The administrator of
her estate sued the State, the hospital, and several clinicians
individually, alleging, inter alia, that the hospital violated
Brenda’s substantive due process rights.316 The district court
dismissed the lawsuit for failing to state a claim, ruling that the
state did not owe Brenda affirmative duties because she was a
voluntary patient.317
306. See id. at 296 (stating that Kathleen’s formal status is not
determinative, and that the lower court must resolve whether Kathleen was, in
effect, involuntary).
307. Shelton v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2012).
308. Compare id. at 839 (explaining the facts in Shelton), with supra notes
288–94 and accompanying text (explaining the facts in Kennedy).
309. Shelton, 677 F.3d at 839.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 839–40.
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On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the arguments concentrated
on Kennedy’s proper application.318 Brenda’s estate argued that,
under Kennedy, affirmative duties were triggered when the
hospital staff discovered that Brenda had hanged herself.319 The
court pointed out that the estate “appear[ed] to concede” that
duties were not triggered when the clinical staff removed
Brenda’s suicide precautions several days before.320 This fact
differentiated
Brenda’s
circumstances
from
Kathleen
Kennedy’s.321
The two cases were further distinguished, the court
explained, by whether the alleged constitutional violation
occurred before or after the patient attempted suicide.322 The
nurses failed to sufficiently monitor Kathleen before she
committed suicide, while the alleged wrong in Brenda’s case
occurred after the staff found her still alive.323 Brenda was
“wholly incapacitated” and incapable of further harming
herself.324 Consequently, any state statutes requiring involuntary
treatment for persons at risk of self-harm could not have
converted Brenda’s voluntary admission to involuntary (as was
the case in Kennedy).325 Moreover, the court expressed reluctance
to impose potential liability on state actors to emergency
situations,
which
require
“split-second,
emergency-care
decisionmaking.”326 Characterizing Kennedy as “a very close

318. See id. at 840–42 (considering competing interpretations of the Kennedy
decision and its impact on the instant case).
319. Id. at 840–41 (describing petitioner’s arguments).
320. Id. at 841.
321. See id. (explaining that Kennedy involved “at least a degree of” liberty
deprivation because Kathleen was on suicide precautions, differentiating that
case from Shelton, in which Brenda was not on suicide precautions when the
injury occurred).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See id. at 842 (stating that, as a factual matter, Brenda posed no risk of
additional self-harm because she was unconscious).
325. See id. (reasoning that Brenda’s situation resembled an unconscious
patient brought into an emergency room; in such a situation, the state is not
constitutionally obligated to provide treatment).
326. Id.
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case,” the court declined to extend Kennedy’s rule, although it left
the rule intact.327
3. Third Circuit: Torisky v. Schweiker328
The Third Circuit also applied a fact-intensive analysis in
Torisky v. Schweiker.329 In this case, the guardians of twenty
individuals with mental retardation sued Pennsylvania officials
after the patients were transferred between facilities.330 The
patients were all being treated at the Western Center, and when
the state decided to close this facility, it transferred the patients
to other state facilities.331 The patients then brought § 1983
claims seeking monetary and injunctive relief.332 The circuit court
reviewed the district court’s ruling that voluntary patients share
the same constitutional rights under Youngberg that
involuntarily committed patients enjoy.333
To resolve this issue, the court examined DeShaney and
other circuit rulings. From the case law, the court first concluded
that not every mental health patient has Youngberg rights.334
Even though voluntary patients reside in the state’s custody, the
state may not have deprived them of their liberty.335 The court
327. Id.
328. Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 447 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that
whether a voluntary patient possesses due process rights requires “looking
beyond the label of an individual’s confinement to ascertain whether the state
has deprived an individual of liberty in such a way as to trigger Youngberg’s
protections”).
329. Id.
330. Id. at 441.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. See id. (defining the issue as “whether a state’s affirmative duty under
the Due Process Clause to care for and protect a mental health patient in state
custody depends upon the individual’s custody being involuntary”).
334. See id. at 444 (“[T]he substantive rights recognized in Youngberg are
limited to persons whose personal liberty has been substantially curtailed by the
state.” (quoting Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, 921 F.2d 459, 465
(3d Cir. 1990))).
335. See id. at 446 (“Thus, a custodial relationship created merely by an
individual’s voluntary submission to state custody is not a ‘deprivation of liberty’
sufficient to trigger the protections of Youngberg.”).
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extracted a common theme from other circuits’ rulings: whether a
state has deprived an individual’s liberty and triggered
Youngberg’s protections depends on “whether the individual is
free to leave state custody.”336 The court concluded that the
petitioners might be able to prove facts supporting that
Pennsylvania owed them affirmative duties of care.337
The Third Circuit ruled that courts should carefully
scrutinize the facts in order to determine whether voluntary
patients are owed affirmative duties, just as the Eighth Circuit
ruled in Kennedy and implicitly reaffirmed in Shelton.338 But
while Kennedy required a factual determination of whether the
state’s actions had “converted” a voluntary patient into an
involuntary patient,339 the Torisky court did not go so far. The
Third Circuit’s test asks whether the voluntary patient is free to
leave.340 Voluntary patients may be restricted from leaving a
hospital at will without the state initiating formal commitment
proceedings.341 The Third Circuit’s analysis therefore fits more
squarely within DeShaney’s functional-custody exception.342 Its
analysis does not explicitly rely on the voluntary/involuntary

336. Id. at 447. The court looked at cases including Kennedy v. Schafer,
discussed supra in section IV.B.2; Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Center,
discussed supra in section IV.A.2; and Walton v. Alexander, discussed supra in
section IV.A.3.
337. See id. at 448 (concluding that “a constitutional violation may have
occurred”).
338. See id. at 447 (stating that the court must look “beyond the label of an
individual’s confinement”); Shelton v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837,
841–42 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying Kennedy’s rule to the facts in the instant case);
Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292, 296 (8th Cir. 1995) (remanding the case for a
factual determination of Kathleen’s status), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996).
339. See supra notes 303–06 and accompanying text (analyzing Kennedy’s
analysis and ruling).
340. See Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 447 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that
courts must examine the facts of a patient’s custody and determine “whether the
individual is free to leave state custody”).
341. See id. at 446–47 (discussing that patients who voluntarily enter a
hospital may face restrictions on their ability to leave, and noting that
Pennsylvania law allows a hospital to keep a voluntary patient in custody for up
to seventy-two hours).
342. See id. at 444 (referencing DeShaney’s rule that the state owes
affirmative duties to individuals over whom it exercises functional custody).
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distinction but the court’s inquiries overlap with Kennedy’s de
facto involuntary commitment analysis.
V. Concerns about Overreliance on Voluntary/Involuntary
Distinction
Given the division among circuits over what analytic method
courts should use to determine whether voluntary patients are
owed affirmative duties, this Part suggests that an analysis
putting less emphasis on voluntary status is appropriate.
Categorizing patients as either voluntary or involuntary is easy,
but often fails to accurately and reliably capture the full picture
of a patient’s relationship with the state.343 This Part considers
two reasons that a patient’s voluntary status may not accurately
describe his relationship to the state: competency and coercion.
A. Competency: Can Acutely Mentally Ill Patients Give
Informed Consent?
Voluntary admission requires that an individual express his
agreement to be hospitalized by giving informed consent.344
Unless a court has determined that an individual is incompetent,
the law presumes that a person can make personal decisions
regarding medical treatment.345 Competency raises special issues
in the setting of a psychiatric hospitalization.346
When a person is acutely ill with a psychiatric illness—to the
point of requiring inpatient care—is that person competent to
give informed consent? For most of the twentieth century, all
343. The concurrence in Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1309–10 (5th
Cir. 1995) (Parker, J., concurring), highlighted the problem with substituting
voluntary status for a more thorough analysis of the facts.
344. See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The
Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 15, 15–16 (1991)
(explaining that informed consent requires: informational disclosure;
competency; voluntariness; and a decision).
345. See id. at 21–22 (discussing the presumption that adults are legally
competent).
346. See id. at 18 (“[C]ompetency is one of the central questions of mental
health law.”).
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patients were hospitalized involuntarily, and courts believed that
patients’ severe psychiatric symptoms rendered them per se
incompetent.347 The Supreme Court voiced concerns about
competence and voluntary consent in Zinermon v. Burch.348 In
that case, a voluntary patient challenged his admission status,
arguing that he had lacked the capacity to give informed consent
when he signed his voluntary admission paperwork.349 The Court
agreed with the patient, reasoning that mental illness, by its very
nature, “create[s] special problems regarding informed consent,”
meaning that hospital staff may not be justified in accepting a
patient’s proffered consent for treatment “at face value.”350
Generally, competence to make treatment decisions hinges
on whether a patient can make rational decisions about his
treatment or whether he can care for himself.351 Making these
competency determinations imposes considerable burdens on
clinicians and healthcare facilities.352 Finding a patient
incompetent often requires clinicians to follow extra procedures
in the course of providing treatment, because a surrogate decision
maker may now make the patient’s decisions.353 Patients
requiring psychiatric hospitalization may be legally incompetent
because of their acute symptoms, but may nevertheless be treated
as competent and permitted to sign the paperwork for voluntary
admission.354
347. See, e.g., Sporza v. German Sav. Bank, 84 N.E. 406, 408 (N.Y. 1908)
(describing the state’s history of institutionalizing people adjudicated insane “on
account of the necessity of protecting them and the public from their disordered
minds and insane acts”).
348. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138–39 (1990) (affirming that
petitioner stated a claim for relief in alleging that Florida violated his
procedural due process rights by admitting him as a voluntary patient, when
petitioner alleged he was incompetent to give consent at the time of signing the
admission paperwork).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 133 n.18.
351. See JOHN PARRY, CIVIL MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY 147–49 (2010) (reviewing standards for determining competence to
make treatment decisions).
352. Id. at 143.
353. Id.
354. See id. (stating that in order to ensure a patient receives a fair
competency determination, the patient should have a lawyer and access to a
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In such a situation, the patient’s “voluntary” label threatens
to mislead a court relying on the voluntary/involuntary
distinction as a proxy for understanding the relationship between
a patient and the state. The fact that a patient was voluntarily
admitted means little when the admission was flawed.355 As the
Supreme Court pointed out in Zinermon, a legally incompetent
“voluntary” patient may very well be “unlikely to benefit from the
voluntary patient’s statutory right to request discharge.”356
B. Coercion: How do External Forces Influence a Patient’s
Voluntary Status?
Related to capacity and informed consent are concerns that
outside forces—such as professionals, family members, the legal
system, or mental health policies—influence a patient’s status as
voluntary or involuntary.
Apprehensions about clinical staff coercing patients have
influenced mental health policies since the 1960s.357 As discussed
medical expert).
355. See Karna Halverson, Voluntary Admission and Treatment of
Incompetent Persons with a Mental Illness, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 161, 166
(2005) (arguing that “allowing the patient to be voluntarily admitted based on
his or her consent without any competency determination leaves too much room
for abuse”); Albert B. Palmer & Julian Wohl, Voluntary Admission Forms: Does
the Patient Know What He’s Signing?, 23 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 38, 38
(1972) (presenting results from a study, which indicated that only one of forty
patients could recount the essential provisions of a signed voluntary admission
form); Donald H. Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric
Hospitalization: Myth or Reality?, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 26 (1999) (“Voluntary
psychiatric hospitalization should be the result of a competent and informed
decision arrived at within a non-coercive environment. Hospitalization based on
anything less is not only involuntary, but it is an infringement of personal
liberty.”); id. at 36 (“[O]ften a mentally ill person, upon arrival at a psychiatric
hospital, is disoriented or distressed. Because the patients are disturbed,
confused, frightened, and distraught, there are indications that they are unable
to comprehend the major step they take through self-admission.”).
356. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 133 (1990).
357. See PARRY, supra note 351, at 467 (discussing concerns that patients
were coerced to accept voluntary hospitalization and care). Beyond questions of
coercion in the admission process are questions about coercion in treatment. See
MORRIS, supra note 176, at 171 (stating that professionals have long debated
whether involuntarily committed individuals may refuse treatment). In general,
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above, voluntary hospitalization became increasingly popular
among legal and psychiatric professionals in the last century, and
an increasing proportion of patients consented to voluntary
admission during this same period.358 Similarly, as state-hospital
professionals returned to preferring involuntary admissions,
more state-hospital patients are being involuntarily admitted.359
This power to influence patients’ decisions blurs the line
dividing voluntary and involuntary patients. For example, the
Supreme Court noted that if a voluntary patient is actually
incapable of making informed decisions, this patient probably is
not in a position to exercise his legal rights.360 The hospital
setting increases the risk that patients’ decisions will be unduly
influenced.361 Psychiatric clinicians treating acutely ill patients
approach issues like coercion differently than do constitutional
scholars.362 Legal scholars tend to focus on broad principles;
clinicians, however, focus more on individual patients and how
different actions will affect them.363 Clinicians’ results-based
lawyers have supported the right to refuse in order to prevent a “therapeutic
orgy,” while mental health professionals have opposed a blanket right in order
ensure that patients receive necessary treatment. Id.
358. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text (discussing the
movement toward voluntary hospitalization). Several states even enacted laws
creating a rebuttable presumption in favor of voluntary admission. See PARRY,
supra note 351, at 468 (explaining how some states’ formal policies favor
voluntary hospitalization); supra note 167 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the trend back to
civil commitment in state hospitals).
360. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 133 (1990) (stating that
incompetent patients are “unlikely to benefit from the voluntary patient’s
statutory right to request discharge”).
361. See PARRY, supra note 351, at 149 (stating that “the possibility of
overreaching and improper influence increases” in inpatient settings).
362. See Robert D. Miller, The Continuum of Coercion: Constitutional and
Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74
DENV. U. L. REV. 1169, 1171–72 (1997) (identifying and discussing multiple
reasons that legal scholars and psychiatric clinicians approach issues
differently).
363. See id. at 1172 (identifying differences between how legal scholars and
psychiatric clinicians generally consider issues related to inpatient psychiatric
care). Legal scholars tend to assume that clients’ wishes should be honored, and
they focus narrowly on achieving specific goals, like freedom from restraint. Id.
In contrast, clinicians focus more broadly on providing effective treatment,
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orientation is arguably reasonable; most involuntary patients
whose symptoms respond to treatment retrospectively agree that
the treatment was in their best interest.364 But aside from
arguments about the utility of coerced treatment, the fact
remains that coercion is a frequent part of inpatient psychiatric
care—even voluntary treatment.365 The “voluntary” label masks
coercive elements, giving the impression that any given voluntary
patient has fully and competently consented to psychiatric
hospitalization.366
Coercion might arise from a variety of sources. The simple
threat of involuntary commitment leads some patients to sign
voluntary admission forms.367 State law may incentivize patients
to avoid involuntary commitment to avoid having a commitment
order “on the record.”368 Other patients have described feeling
internally coerced by their psychiatric symptoms.369 The legal
system’s announced preference for voluntary admissions—as
expressed by state statutes, court opinions, policy declarations,
and scholars—may play out by encouraging patients to voluntary
treatment, but at the expense of enjoying the legal protections
springing from involuntary status.370
ensuring that a patient continues engaging in treatment after discharge, and
maintaining a safe and therapeutic environment for all patients. Id.
364. See id. at 1174 (reviewing empirical evidence about patients’ attitudes
after receiving effective treatment).
365. See id. (stating that the label “‘voluntary’ is at best misleading and, at
worst, fraud”).
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1175; see also Petrila, supra note 178, at 393–94 & n.110
(reviewing empirical research indicating that psychiatric patients often consent
to hospitalization based on the threat that if they do not consent, they may be
civilly committed).
368. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1464a(1) (2012) (“[T]he court shall
immediately order the department of state police to enter the [involuntary
commitment] order into the law enforcement information network. The
department of state police shall remove the court order from the law
enforcement information network only upon receipt of a subsequent court order
for that removal.”).
369. Miller, supra note 362, at 1175.
370. See Stone, supra note 355, at 27–29
The reasons given for voluntary admission include: (1) it involves less
stigma to the patient; (2) it is less coercive; (3) it allows the patient to
acknowledge a desire for help and treatment; (4) it respects
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Coercion is often indirect. Voluntary patients may be
influenced by their fellow patients.371 Currently, because state
hospitals are admitting a higher proportion of involuntary,
dangerous patients, voluntary patients are affected in the
hospital’s milieu and often receive less clinical attention than
their more aggressive peers.372 Moreover, many voluntary
patients only agree to hospitalization in the first place because
their family or caregiver pressured them to get inpatient
treatment.373
These coercive elements, coupled with uncertainties about
capacity, suggest that the voluntary/involuntary distinction
cannot validly measure affirmative duties. Coercion and capacity
go directly to the nature of the hospitalization.374 The label
“voluntary” is an artificial signifier that communicates limited
information about whether a patient truly made an informed,
intelligent decision to be institutionalized.

individual autonomy; (5) it allows the patient the legal right to
request release; (6) it increases patient involvement and personal
responsibility; (7) it prevents further deterioration while awaiting the
civil commitment hearing; (8) it is less time consuming than a
hearing; (9) involuntary admission forces doctor and patient into an
adversarial relationship that undermines the therapeutic alliance
and adversely affects the patient’s participation in treatment; (10) the
patient is more likely to succeed; (11) there is a perception that the
stay is shorter; (12) the patient who voluntarily undertakes
treatment is more likely to be rehabilitated than an involuntary
patient; (13) it is normalizing since it is very similar to other medical
admissions.
The reasons against voluntary admissions include: (1) the potential
for patient abuse exists; (2) the patient is subject to coercion; (3) the
patient has fewer opportunities for discharge; (4) the patient is
admitted under the threat of involuntary commitment; (5) the patient
does not consult an attorney; (6) there is no adversarial process;
(7) there is no judicial determination; (8) there is no maximum length
of stay; (9) the patient is not free to leave; (10) it is unavailable when
the patient is incapable of being in charge.
371. Miller, supra note 362, at 1181.
372. Id.
373. See id. at 1210 (stating that patients’ families usually favor treatment).
374. See id. (stating that “mentally disordered persons are perhaps subject
to more coercion than most other groups” and this coercion often leads to
“voluntary” admissions).
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VI. Proposed Analysis for Determining Duties to a Voluntary
Patient
How should courts analyze whether a state-hospital patient
was owed affirmative duties of care and protection under
substantive due process? This subpart proposes a three-step
analysis that avoids the pitfall of overrelying on the voluntary
distinction.375
A. The Proposed Analysis
Courts should not use a patient’s formal voluntary status as
a proxy for understanding a patient’s relationship to the state.
The voluntary/involuntary distinction is unreliable and it unduly
constrains the analysis.376 So how can courts determine which
voluntary patients are owed Youngberg duties and which are not?
DeShaney itself suggests a straightforward approach.
Starting with the general no-duty rule, DeShaney then offered
three exceptions, each triggering affirmative duties: formal
custody, functional custody, and state-created danger.377 This
translates cleanly into a three-part test that considers whether
any of these exceptions apply when a plaintiff alleges that a State
violated an affirmative duty.378
In the state hospital context, this three-part test provides
courts with a logical method for analyzing affirmative duties.
When a patient sues the State based on a claim that the state
failed to provide an affirmative duty of care or protection, the
court should begin with the general rule that no duty exists.379
375. Infra Part VI.A.
376. See supra Part V (arguing that the voluntary distinction fails as a
screening tool).
377. See supra Part II.B.2 (analyzing DeShaney).
378. See Higgs v. Latham, No. 91-5273, 1991 WL 216464, at *6 (6th Cir. Oct.
24, 1991) (per curiam) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring) (arguing that the court
should “go beyond asking whether [the patient] was a voluntary admittee” and
consider whether the state-created danger or functional custody exceptions
apply).
379. See supra Part II.A (discussing the general no-duty rule in substantive
due process).
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Before addressing any qualified immunity arguments, the court
should determine whether the plaintiff has established that he
was owed affirmative duties at the time of injury.380 Next, the
court should determine whether one of three exceptions apply.
First, affirmative duties arise if the state civilly commits the
patient, taking formal custody.381 Patients with a formal
“involuntary” status, like Mr. Romeo,382 fall into this exception.
The voluntary/involuntary distinction is used as a screening tool
for this exception, sorting out which patients are in the state’s
formal custody. The distinction does not mean that involuntary
status is the source of the affirmative duties, only that
involuntary patients meet the standard for acquiring affirmative
duties, as decided in Youngberg.
Second, affirmative duties arise if the state acts to take
functional custody over a voluntary patient.383 In this analysis,
the court may look to state actions that potentially converted the
voluntary hospitalization into a de facto involuntary one. For
example, courts might find functional custody if the facts show
that: the patient lacked capacity at the time he signed voluntary
paperwork; staff coerced the patient to sign voluntary paperwork;
the patient requested to be discharged and staff declined this
request; or the staff exercised an extremely high degree of control
over the patient, with the effect of excluding other people from
helping the patient. In Higgs, for example, the fact that Mrs.
Higgs was under a court order for inpatient care and that her
requests to be discharged were denied could create an affirmative
duty.384 By contrast, the functional custody exception should fail
in Monahan unless Mr. Monahan could show that he was coerced
to remain in the state’s care.385

380. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (stating
that courts should determine whether a plaintiff was owed a constitutional duty
before reaching qualified immunity arguments).
381. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Youngberg’s rule that involuntary
commitment triggers affirmative duties).
382. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Youngberg).
383. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the functional custody exception).
384. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing Higgs).
385. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Monahan).
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Third, affirmative duties arise if the state created or
increased the danger that caused the patient’s harm.386 Courts
again should apply the standards developed within their own
circuits for state-created danger.387 State-created danger may be
found if the plaintiff can show that: the state had documented
awareness either that the patient was substantially at risk to
injure himself or be injured by another person; the staff cut off
other sources of aid, such as limiting visitors’ access or not
informing family about the patient’s risk; and the state, by a
direct action or policy, increased the likelihood that the patient
would suffer the foreseen harm. If another patient inflicted the
injury, courts should scrutinize whether the hospital reasonably
should have known that the wrongdoer might commit this harm.
State-created danger might apply in Shelton, given that Brenda
was an inpatient, cut off from any other sources of aid, and
hospital staff refused to administer resuscitation—although this
outcome is less clear.388 Kennedy presents a clearer case of statecreated danger because staff—aware that Kathleen presented
such a serious risk of suicide that she required constant staff
presence—failed to follow these ordered precautions.389 The state
hospital cannot become a “snake pit” without the state acquiring
affirmative duties.390
B. Benefits of this Approach
The Proposed Analysis offers a straightforward application of
DeShaney and Youngberg, nudging courts to look beyond
voluntary/involuntary issues. This subpart explains three
benefits from this analysis: it considers the voluntary/involuntary

386. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the state-created danger exception).
387. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (reviewing state-created
danger tests).
388. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Shelton).
389. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Kennedy).
390. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (analogizing
the state-created danger scenario to the government throwing a man into a
snake pit).
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distinction appropriately, it comports squarely with substantive
due process doctrine, and it does not unduly burden states.391
1. The Proposed Analysis Appropriately Considers the Voluntary
Distinction
A primary benefit of the proposed analysis is that it accords
the
voluntary
distinction
appropriate
weight.
The
voluntary/involuntary distinction determines whether the formal
custody exception applies. Civilly committed patients fall clearly
within Youngberg and their affirmative rights are clearly
established.392
For voluntary patients, however, the analysis limits the
importance of the voluntary/involuntary distinction. Consistent
with most circuits, the analysis rejects the idea that all voluntary
patients have Youngberg rights.393 But the analysis also rejects
the idea that formal commitment procedures are required.394
Instead, the analysis directs courts to apply the functional
custody and state-created danger exceptions. Circuits cultivated
these doctrines in the years since DeShaney, and there is no
reason that courts cannot apply these tests in state hospital
contexts.395

391. See infra Parts VI.B.1–3 (discussing each benefit in turn).
392. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining Youngberg’s rule).
393. See, e.g., Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 446 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]
custodial relationship created merely by an individual’s voluntary submission to
state custody is not a ‘deprivation of liberty’ sufficient to trigger the protections
of Youngberg.”).
394. See id. (rejecting the argument that “a court commitment to state
custody is a necessary characteristic of a deprivation of liberty sufficient to
trigger Youngberg[]”).
395. See Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1309 (5th Cir. 1995) (Parker, J.,
concurring) (“Rather than simply asking whether a person entered state custody
‘voluntarily,’ we should examine the nature of the custodial relationship that
existed between the State and the plaintiff.”); Higgs v. Latham, No. 91-5273,
1991 WL 216464, at *6 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1991) (per curiam) (Suhrheinrich, J.,
concurring) (arguing that courts should “go beyond asking whether [the patient]
was a voluntary admittee” and consider whether the state-created danger or
functional custody exceptions apply).
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The proposed analysis protects voluntary patients’ rights.
Psychiatric patients—both voluntary and involuntary—face
barriers to vindicating their legal rights.396 And the patients
labeled “voluntary” may be even more vulnerable, given that
their admissions may be tainted by coercion or flawed consent.397
The analysis recognizes this vulnerability and allows courts some
discretion in ruling on a particular set of facts. This discretion is
fitting. Substantive due process
formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those
envisaged in other [constitutional provisions]. Its application
is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an
appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which
may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental
fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in
other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations,
fall short of such denial.398

Tests relying on the voluntary distinction constrain courts by
obstructing their ability to find affirmative duties in specific
cases.
Giving courts more flexibility to find affirmative duties to
voluntary patients furthers the goals of § 1983. Section 1983
should not “supplant traditional tort law,”399 but neither should
§ 1983 claims be rendered useless. As the Supreme Court
explained in Monroe v. Pape,400 § 1983 claims should

396. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974)
Mental patients are particularly unlikely to be aware of their legal
rights. They are likely to have especially limited access to legal
assistance. Individual suits may be protracted and expensive, and
individual mental patients may therefore be deterred from bringing
them. And individual suits may produce distortive therapeutic effects
within an institution, since a staff may tend to give especially good—
or especially harsh—treatment to patients the staff expects or knows
to be litigious.
397. See supra Part V (discussing how issues related to competence and
coercion may render a formal voluntary admission status misleading).
398. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942), overruled on other grounds by
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
399. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
400. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) rev’d in part, Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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supplement state law claims.401 If a voluntary patient makes out
sufficient facts to convince the court that the state owed him
affirmative duties, he must be able to enforce this right.402
Moreover, § 1983’s remedies—the injunction and litigation
costs, specifically—are powerful and important tools for
prompting institutional reform in state hospitals.403 As state
hospitals evolve by closing down beds, admitting more criminal
defendants, and treating more dangerous and more seriously ill
patients,404 § 1983 should retain its power as a sword. The
Supreme Court recently indicated that courts cannot limit the
injunction’s potency by denying this relief to a broad class of
people.405 The analysis offers voluntary patients the chance to
persuade a court to use this sword.
2. The Proposed Analysis Retains Doctrinal Integrity
The proposed analysis is also faithful to existing law. First,
with regard to substantive due process, doctrinal integrity is
imperative because substantive due process is vulnerable to

401. See id. at 171 (concluding that Congress intended for the Act to “give a
remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights”). After reviewing legislative
history, the Court found that Congress planned for the Act to serve three
purposes: to override invidious state laws, to provide remedy when state law
insufficiently protected rights, and to provide additional remedies when state
remedies were inadequate or impractical. Id. at 173–74.
402. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws.”).
403. See, e.g., United States v. Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 2010)
(refusing to vacate outstanding orders stemming from a district court’s original
1993 injunction against a state hospital that was violating patients’ substantive
due process rights); Thomas v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250, 251–52 (4th Cir. 1990)
(upholding a district court’s order for injunctive relief for a class of patients
whose constitutional rights were violated by the “deficient care” in state
hospitals).
404. See supra Part III.B (discussing changes in state hospitals since the
1950s).
405. See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006) (rejecting
“expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad
swath of cases”).
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confusion and misapplication.406 Courts frequently approach
claims purporting to potentially expand individual rights with
“wariness and even embarrassment.”407 By deriving its analysis
directly from DeShaney, the analysis avoids arbitrarily expanding
substantive due process’s protections. After focusing courts’
attention through DeShaney’s lens, the analysis points to specific
factors relevant to state hospitals. For example, questions about
coercion and competence raise significant concerns in state
hospitals, but are probably irrelevant in contexts lacking any
potential for the victim to “consent to” the state’s control. The
analysis captures a clear picture of a patient’s relationship to the
state, rather than a mere glimpse of voluntary status.
Second, the proposed analysis is more consistent with legal
doctrine related to custody than are the status-driven approaches
some circuits currently apply. While the Supreme Court has not
addressed whether voluntary patients are “in custody,” it has
offered guidance on this question in the Fourth Amendment
context.408 Custody assessments—at least for Fourth Amendment
purposes—require courts to approach the situation from the
individual’s point of view, not the state’s.409 How do these rules
relate to custody for substantive due process purposes? The Sixth
Circuit argued that in the context of voluntary patients, custody
claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments should be
treated identically.410 The Third Circuit similarly ruled in Torisky
that affirmative duties must depend on whether the patient is
free to leave.411 Because custody turns on the individual’s
objective perspective, in state hospitals, a patient’s legal
406. See Richard H. Fallon, Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 309 (1993) (“Due
process doctrine subsists in confusion.”).
407. Id.
408. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per curiam)
(stating that whether or not a person is “in custody” depends on the perspective
of a reasonable person in the suspect’s position).
409. Id.
410. See Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“Differentiating Fourteenth Amendment cases from . . . Fourth Amendment
[cases] based on the voluntary or involuntary nature of the state’s custody would
lead to arguably inconsistent results.”).
411. See supra note 337 (giving Torisky’s ruling).
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voluntary status should not be conflated with his reasonably
perceived status. If a voluntary patient reasonably believes that
he has no right to leave, his “voluntary” label means little.
Third, the proposed analysis offers courts a coherent
framework for analysis. This point is highlighted by Kennedy. In
that case, the Eighth Circuit found affirmative duties by
determining that Kathleen, while formally a voluntary patient,
may have been constructively involuntary.412 By stretching the
category of “involuntary” patients in this way, the decision
unnecessarily muddies the law. The court’s rationale that “[f]acts
change, and legal status follows facts,”413 would suggest that if
the facts of Kennedy remained the same, but Kathleen had not
killed herself, she nevertheless would have been involuntary—
but without any of the due process protections afforded by the
civil commitment process. Zinermon directly prohibits such a
result.414 The Kennedy court’s analysis comports more squarely
within the proposed analysis, allowing it to neatly find
affirmative duties arising from state-created danger, rather than
stretching the voluntary/involuntary distinction beyond its fibers.
3. The Proposed Analysis Will Not Unduly Expand Affirmative
Duties
Allowing some voluntary patients Youngberg rights is
unlikely to produce intolerable policy results. States frequently
assert that imposing liability will force unsustainably weighty
burdens on them and cause a disastrous fallout.415 These
concerns should be viewed with a critical eye. For example, some
advocates charge that states will stop admitting voluntary
412. Kennedy v. Shafer, 71 F.3d 1522, 295 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1018 (1996).
413. Id. at 296.
414. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138–39 (1990) (ruling that voluntary
admission proceedings cannot substitute for involuntary commitment).
415. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Schafer v. Kennedy, No.
95-1697, 1996 WL 33439744, at *16 (Apr. 19, 1996) (arguing that the Eighth
Circuit’s ruling that a de facto involuntary patient is owed affirmative duties
incentivizes states “to deny care to the mentally ill”), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1018
(1996).
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patients altogether because the risk of liability “is too great to
jeopardize” state resources.416 Aware that current “voluntary”
patients might be relabeled “involuntary” by some court in the
future, the argument goes, hospital staff will be left unsure
whether they owe affirmative duties.417
To be sure, increasing potential liability in state hospitals
will produce corollary burdens. Underfunded state mental health
systems may be forced to spend their tight budgets on legal fees
and judgments.418 State hospital workers would also face
increased exposure to personal liability, and may be unable to
obtain insurance coverage for constitutional violations.419
When considered in light of the current state hospital
system,420 however, these concerns appear overblown. First, it
seems implausible that states will stop admitting and treating
voluntary patients. History belies such an argument. Youngberg
explicitly granted affirmative duties to every involuntary patient,
but states did not react by refusing to treat involuntary patients,
a decision that would have been within states’ discretion.421 Why
would a different result follow if some voluntary patients are
granted affirmative rights? Hypothetically, if states did react by
shutting their doors to voluntary patients, then they would
correspondingly open their doors to more involuntary patients.422
The result would be that every patient would possess affirmative
Youngberg rights.423 Allowing voluntary patients to establish
416. Id.
417. Id. at *16–17.
418. See id. at *17–19 (arguing that state budgets will suffer potentially
untenable consequences if voluntary patients are found to have affirmative
rights).
419. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 138 (discussing due
process claims against individual clinicians).
420. See supra Part III.B (discussing how state hospitals evolved in recent
decades).
421. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Youngberg); see also supra note 183
and accompanying text (noting that state hospitals are trending toward
involuntary patients).
422. See SAMHSA FUNDING REPORT, supra note 175, at 69–70 (stating that
many states currently face a shortage of state hospital beds).
423. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316–17 (1982) (ruling that
states owe affirmative duties under substantive due process to involuntarily
committed individuals).
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affirmative constitutional rights, then, should not be precluded
out of concerns for state budgets.
Second, state actors are protected by the deferential
professional judgment standard for imposing liability.424 The
professional judgment standard is more deferential than the
“reasonable care” standard in malpractice claims.425 The
reasonable care standard imposes liability if a defendant’s
conduct deviates at all from what a reasonable professional would
do; the professional judgment standard imposes liability only for
a substantial deviation.426 The Supreme Court chose this
standard in Youngberg to avoid overly burdening states.427 The
Court reasoned that the professional judgment standard protects
hospitals and individual clinicians by relieving them of a burden
“to make each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.”428
With this standard’s protections, state actors will be insulated
from an uncontrolled new wave of liability.
VII. Conclusions
The government owes us nothing. DeShaney highlighted this
general principle with its unrelentingly formal analysis of a
shockingly tragic case.429 And DeShaney’s message has been
received in lower courts.430

424. See id. at 324 (“In determining whether the State has met its
obligations . . . decisions made by the appropriate professional are entitled to a
presumption of correctness.”).
425. See PARRY, supra note 351, at 652 (discussing both standards).
426. Id.
427. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324 (“Such a presumption is necessary to
enable institutions of this type—often, overcrowded and understaffed—to
continue to function.”).
428. Id. at 325.
429. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.2 (discussing the no-duty rule and DeShaney).
430. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 3.09[B] (“DeShaney has generated an
unusually large volume of important lower federal court rulings.”); see also Doe
v. Milwaukee Cnty., 712 F. Supp. 1370, 1371 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (“Joshua
DeShaney will never know it, unfortunately, but he has had a dramatic impact
on constitutional law. The case that grew out of a tragedy . . . is already
affecting law suits across the country.”).
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But amidst this post-DeShaney storm, courts must not
overlook the exceptional cases. Sometimes the government does
owe a duty to protect or care for individuals.431 State hospitals
present a complicated context for evaluating when affirmative
duties apply, and state-hospital patients are particularly
vulnerable.432 A patient’s relationship with the state is more
complicated than his voluntary status. Courts falter when they
conflate a patient’s voluntary status—either formal or de facto—
with a sound legal test for affirmative duties.
Voluntary status should not preclude affirmative duties.
Courts should have some modicum of discretion to provide a just
ruling in the case at hand.433 The proposed analysis suggested in
this Note offers a flexible standard without sacrificing doctrinal
integrity.434
Stepping back and reflecting on DeShaney and its wake, it’s
almost surprising to remember that some of the most important
facts remain a mystery. Wisconsin never explained why it chose
not to intervene to protect little Joshua, even as the social worker
dutifully chronicled her suspicions “in detail that seems almost
eerie.”435 No explanation was required once the Court found that
no duty existed.436
But DeShaney explicitly demanded that sometimes an
explanation is needed. Sometimes state actors should be called
upon to explain their decisions. In cases involving state-hospital
patients, courts should not gloss over the special issues that may
431. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.C.1–2 (discussing Youngberg, the functional
custody exception, and the state-created danger exception).
432. See supra Parts III, V (reviewing mental health law and the nature of
state hospitals).
433. See, e.g., BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66
(1921)
There is an old legend that on one occasion God prayed, and his
prayer was “Be it my will that my justice be ruled by my mercy.” That
is a prayer which we all need to utter at times when the demon of
formalism tempts the intellect with the lure of scientific order.
434. See supra Part VI (containing the proposed analysis and arguing its
strengths).
435. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 209
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
436. Id.
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arise. Courts should ask whether the state created a duty,
whether by civilly committing a patient, by exercising functional
custody, or by creating a danger. When the government takes
those actions against us, then it does owe us something.

